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Preface
Improving equitable access to quality health services is one of the main pillars of 
the World Bank Health, Nutrition, and Population Strategy. The Bank gives high 
priority to ensuring equitable and sustainable improvements in health outcomes 
with particular attention to enhancing the well-being of the poor and vulnerable 
population as part of its primary mission to reduce poverty and promote shared 
prosperity across the globe. Within this framework, the Bank supports the aspira-
tions of developing countries toward universal health coverage as an important 
goal that will contribute to each  country’s efforts in ensuring inclusive and sus-
tainable development.
The Bank has identified the inadequate availability of health services and 
health workers, especially in rural and remote areas, as well as weak management 
and limited incentives—often not linked to performance—as some of the leading 
causes of the poor performance of health systems. The Human Resources for 
Health (HRH) program at the World Bank has been established to assist countries 
to carry out critical upstream analytic work that will inform health policy and 
improve the performance of health systems in an equitable and sustainable man-
ner. The focus of the HRH program is on areas where the World Bank has a 
comparative advantage, including labor market analysis, the synergies between 
HRH and health financing policies, HRH budget and cost analysis, and assessment 
of health worker incentives and evaluation of performance-based pay policies.
This publication is part of the Bank’s multiyear program to enhance its 
 knowledge of HRH policies. The program’s ultimate objective is to strengthen 
knowledge and capacity to collect evidence, analyze, and evaluate the effective-
ness of HRH interventions in the context of a country’s health system strength-
ening strategy. It specifically addresses the theoretical and empirical evidence on 
health labor markets in low- and middle-income countries. 
Health labor market analysis has much to contribute to resolving globally wide-
spread HRH problems, and continuing neglect of these problems provides some 
explanation for their persistence. Policy makers in countries promulgating or refin-
ing strategies for achieving universal health coverage will find it important to 
understand how key elements in their health labor market are likely to interact and 
how these interactions could help—or hinder—progress toward universal health 
coverage. These interactions are complex and multidimensional, and this publica-
tion highlights some areas where forces in the health labor market matter most.
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Overview
The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview of the key issues when 
attempting to apply economics to the analysis of health workers’ labor markets. 
Though much has been written and planned about health human resources, a 
major weakness with most of this analysis is that it does not use an economic 
perspective. The use of an explicit economic framework applied by trained 
economists moves the focus away from simplistic but costly policy responses 
such as training more doctors and nurses, toward understanding more carefully 
the role of incentives, productivity, and the distribution of health workers. The 
health workforce is but one part of the health system, and a focus of analysis on 
only the health workforce is insufficient to be able to determine the optimal 
number of health workers. Market forces cannot be relied upon to solve health 
worker shortages or maldistribution, due to well-recognized market failures in 
health care. This also has implications for how labor economics and labor market 
analysis can be applied and used successfully in the health care sector.
The policy drivers of health workforce reform are a seemingly persistent mis-
match between “need” and existing supply of health care services, including 
health workers. The document outlines how the health workforce is related to 
the rest of the health care system, and to other social and economic determinants 
of population health and well-being. It addresses the question of why market 
forces cannot be relied on to solve health worker shortages and why government 
intervention and regulation are required due to broader and well-recognized 
market failures in health care and health labor markets. The scale and types of 
gov ernment intervention vary across countries. The publication summarizes the 
evidence from low- and middle-income countries of market failures, government 
interventions, and their implications for health care provision. 
The document combines the analytical framework of labor economics with an 
understanding of market failure provided by health economics, to provide a 
framework that can be used to further understanding of the dynamics of health 
worker labor markets. Demand-side issues include pay-setting arrangements 
and skill mix and task substitution. Supply-side issues include education and train-
ing, workforce participation, migration and retention, dual practice, geographic 
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distribution, productivity and performance, and health worker motivation. The 
economic approach to each of these issues is summarized, followed by a brief 
review of the literature in high income countries, and a more detailed review of 
studies from low- and middle-income countries.
Applying the economic framework to policy issues requires an understanding 
of both the types of economic analysis that can be conducted, and also the data 
required to undertake such analyses. There are two main types of economic 
analysis that can be conducted. Descriptive labor market analysis examines the 
current state and trends in the labor market and might generate more specific 
research questions and hypotheses. Causal labor market analysis is concerned 
with examining the causal effect of factors influencing the labor market behavior 
of employers and health workers, and can be based on the evaluation of policy 
changes on a range of labor market outcomes. 
To conduct these types of analyses, a range of different sources of data can 
be used. However, data must include the earnings of health workers, and also 
be a panel/longitudinal, such that health workers data can be linked over time. 
In addition to randomized trials, panel data provides the most powerful data 
that be used to examine the causal effects of policy and of factors influencing 
behavior. These are the two most important gaps in current data collections 
that need to be addressed and that are currently preventing the application 
of economics to the analysis of health worker labor markets. Better data will 
also attract those with economics and micro-econometrics training to conduct 
research in this area.
There are three essential ways forward: first, more systematic and consistent 
application of economic thinking to human resources for health issues; second, 
building capacity by investment in better administrative and survey data that are 
matched to each other, and include data on earnings; and third, building capacity 
by involving more health and labor economists in health workforce research.
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Introduction
The aim of this publication is to examine how labor and health economics can be 
used to analyze and better understand the role and functions of health worker labor 
 markets. Health workforce shortages stem not only from inadequate overall supply, 
but also from suboptimal allocation of health human resources by location and role. 
Low performance and productivity are also issues. These three problems are often 
compounded by a resource problem—the gap between the finances required for an 
 “adequate” workforce and those likely available. The application of labor economics 
to health care labor markets needs to account for the specific institutional features and 
market failures in health care.
Policy responses to shortages of health workers in low- and middle-income coun-
tries (LMICs) have to date almost exclusively focused on addressing shortages 
through “scaling up” interventions that increase the supply of health workers. 
This assumes that more health workers are a cost-effective way to improve the 
population’s health.
Though training and numbers are clearly an issue, it is also vital to ensure that 
the health workers already employed are used to their best effect, are productive, 
and are employed at reasonable cost; and that those newly trained are retained 
and encouraged to provide cost-effective treatments and procedures in special-
ties and geographic areas where the need for health care is high. These should be 
key objectives of health human resource policy, taking account of the ethical and 
equity issues surrounding health workforce migration between countries and 
between urban and rural areas within a country.
Pure scaling up largely ignores the potential contribution of labor and health 
economics in understanding how health worker labor markets function. An eco-
nomic approach to labor markets is fundamental in fully understanding issues of 
health workforce shortages, productivity, and performance, and the appropriate 
policy responses.
The issues can be categorized into four “problems”: quantity, allocation, per-
formance, and resources (Andalon and Fields, forthcoming). Health workforce 
shortages are due not only to inadequate overall supply (the quantity problem), 
c h a p t e r  1
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but also to a suboptimal allocation of health human resources in a range of inter-
dependent submarkets (the allocation problem), notably between:
•	 geographic areas within and between countries, including urban–rural imbal-
ance and migration;
•	 public and private sectors, including issues arising from dual practice;
•	 medicine, nursing, and other health workers—skill mix;
•	 medical specialties—generalist, primary, community-based care versus special-
ist care; and
•	 treatment settings—primary care, outpatients, acute care hospitals, and 
 informal care at home.
Low performance and productivity are also often issues. If they were increased, 
fewer health workers would be required and health outcomes improved.
These three issues are often compounded by the resource problem—the gap 
between the finances required to expand the workforce to the required degree 
and those available in the near future.
The aim of this document is to examine how labor and health economics can 
be used to analyze and better understand the role and functions of health worker 
labor markets. It draws on the framework of labor economics (Andalon and 
Fields, forthcoming; Scheffler et al. 2012) and the insights of health economics 
to provide a conceptual framework that can contribute to guiding more appro-
priate and effective analysis and data collection related to the health workforce. 
The conceptual framework of labor economics has been highlighted in publica-
tions by the World Bank and World Health Organization (WHO) (Andalon and 
Fields, forthcoming; Scheffler et al. 2012). This publication goes several steps 
further by reviewing the types of analysis and data requirements necessary to 
apply this framework to health workforce issues in LMICs in more depth than 
has been undertaken previously.
The application of labor economics to the analysis of general labor markets is 
often different from the application of labor and health economics to the analysis 
of health workers’ labor markets (box 1.1). This is largely due to the different 
set of policy and institutional issues that drive theoretical and empirical research 
Box 1.1 labor and health economics
Labor economics is a large field of economics that provides a framework for understanding 
how labor markets work. Only a handful of its concepts and tools, however, have been applied 
to health worker labor markets.
The theoretical and empirical approaches in traditional labor economics deal with issues 
and market imperfections in aggregate, that is, the whole labor market. Some of these topics 
are less relevant to health workers as they focus on low-income workers and unemployment, 
minimum wages, wage inequality, and trade unions.
box continues next page
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Other topics have been little analyzed in health care because the issues faced by health 
workers are assumed to be no different from those faced by other workers. Examining one 
or  two specific health care occupations is unlikely to inform broad economic policy. These 
 topics include gender discrimination, immigration, human capital development, and skills 
 formation. Such topics are largely driven by broader economic objectives, notably raising 
employment and productivity, and thus economic growth.
The drivers of, and therefore interest in, health workforce policy are different. Though the 
benefits of achieving these broader economic objectives are also important for a productive 
health care sector, improvements in health status are valued independently of these objec-
tives. Better health status indeed leads to gains in employment and economic growth, but is 
valued in its own right as a separate objective, sometimes called “extra-welfarism” in the health 
economics literature (Hurley 2000).
The policy drivers of health workforce reform in health care are a seemingly persistent 
mismatch between “need” and existing supply of health care services, including health 
workers. The issues are broader than a focus on health worker labor markets and include the 
efficiency and distribution of health care organizations. This leads to a natural focus on 
health worker labor markets given the labor intensive nature of health care production. As 
we will see in chapter 3, because demand cannot easily be defined in health care due to 
market failure,  concepts of medically defined need dominate, which may be unrelated to 
willingness to pay and patients’ preferences. This leads to the impression in health care that 
there are never enough resources to meet this need, and that all needs should be met. There 
is little consideration of resource scarcity.
These particular features of labor and product markets in health care have meant that the 
analysis of health labor markets has taken a different direction from that of wider labor mar-
kets. For example, asymmetry of information between doctors and patients has led, in health 
economics, to a focus on principal–agent relationships, optimal incentive contracts, specific 
areas of information and organizational economics, and the effect of different methods of 
remuneration on productivity and performance, rather than the level of wages (a central focus 
of labor economics).
Asymmetry of information has also led to a focus on doctors. As doctors are self-employed 
in many countries, traditional labor market analyses of salaried workers and labor demand 
and supply have been supplanted by the theoretical and empirical analysis of the behavior 
and productivity of groups of health workers in teams and firms, in, for example, private 
 medical groups (small firms) or hospitals. A key practical aspect of labor market analysis in a 
particular country is therefore whether workers are salaried (usually in the public sector) or 
self-employed (in the private sector).
Box 1.1 labor and health economics (continued)
in labor and health economics. Often the application of labor economics to 
health care labor markets ignores the particular institutional and market features 
of health care labor markets. What labor and health economics do share is a com-
mon set of microeconomic theory and micro-econometric empirical methods 
and tools to analyze labor market issues.
6 Introduction
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structure of the publication
The document has four main chapters. After this introduction, the second 
 section sets out a broad framework that needs to be used when examining health 
care labor markets. This includes outlining how health workers are related to the 
rest of the health care system, and to other social and economic determinants of 
population health and well-being. The purpose here is to show that the health 
workforce is only one part of improving population health and well-being, and 
that there may be other more cost-effective ways to improve health than by scal-
ing up the health workforce. We then address the question of why market forces 
cannot be relied on to solve health worker shortages. Government intervention 
and regulation are required due to broader and well-recognized market failures 
in health care and health workforce labor markets, though the scale and types of 
government intervention can vary across countries for a range of reasons.
The third section summarizes the key issues surrounding the demand and 
supply of health workers and how these interact in the health worker labor 
 market. Demand-side issues include pay-setting arrangements and skill mix and 
task substitution. Supply-side issues include retention, geographic distribution, 
sectoral distribution (including dual practice), and performance and motivation. 
Discussion of these issues is followed by a brief summary of the evidence from 
health care labor markets in high-income countries, and a more detailed sum-
mary of the evidence from LMICs.
The review of evidence from LMICs was undertaken using a search strategy to 
identify recent work in English that could broadly be defined as using health labor 
market analysis or elements of it in LMIC contexts. A primary focus is the recent 
literature so as to reflect an interest in the current depiction of health labor mar-
kets, recognizing that these, and the factors influencing them, change quite rapidly. 
Databases searched included Science Direct, Google Scholar, World Bank archives, 
the Health Systems 2020, and HRH Global Resource Center databases. The date 
range searched was 2006 to 2013, although some references prior to 2006 were 
identified through the citations of those articles as particularly relevant.
A count of the geographic focus of studies from LMICs used in this document 
(and listed in the References) is in figure 1.1. This classification is quite rough: 
different elements of some studies are reported in more than one paper, and 
papers that covered a general class of countries (for example “developing”) or a 
whole continent were excluded from the count, while ones covering a distinctive 
list of countries or areas within one or more countries were included. Our focus 
is primarily on LMICs and it is not surprising that the bulk of this literature is 
focused on countries that are deemed to be in human resource crisis, usually 
according to the standard advanced by The World Health Report 2006, of which 
the great majority are in Africa (WHO 2006). It is also unsurprising that in a 
review restricted to English language publication, Anglophone countries are 
more strongly represented than Francophone and Lusophone ones.
The fourth section summarizes the broad analytical approaches used in 
 economics, focusing on issues of causality and labor market dynamics. This also 
Introduction 7
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helps to define the data requirements that are essential to be able both to 
describe the current state of the health worker labor market and to evaluate the 
causal impact of policies that attempt to restore equilibrium.
The final section suggests some gaps in research and analysis for health worker 
labor markets in LMICs. 
references
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Figure 1.1 count of studies in countries covered by the review
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Note: 47 studies with geographically specific empirical content relating to low- and middle-income countries were identified (see References). 
These are spread across 23 countries—17 in Africa.
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A Framework for Analysis
Health workforce policy is a means to an end, and making decisions about the health 
workforce in isolation from the rest of the health care system is problematic.
The role of the health workforce in the health care system can be illustrated using 
a “production function” framework. The framework recognizes that the ultimate aims 
of interventions in health worker labor markets are to improve population health with 
limited resources and to achieve equity goals.
Using a production function framework suggests that size, distribution, and 
 productivity of the health workforce can only be properly examined by accounting 
for all interrelated factors. But the ability to model these relationships empirically 
using good data sources requires further developments in methods and data sources 
for labor market analysis, as modeling the whole system is highly complex—thus 
modeling parts is often pragmatic.
the role of the health Workforce in the health care system
Decisions about the health workforce should not be made in isolation from the 
rest of the health care system, given the tight linkages shown all the more clearly 
in a production function framework (figure 2.1). This framework specifies 
inputs, outputs, and outcomes (including costs). It recognizes that the ultimate 
aims of interventions in health worker labor markets are to improve population 
health with limited resources and to achieve equity goals, in a trade-off between 
efficiency and equity.
The key issue is that the size, distribution, and productivity of the health 
workforce can only be properly examined by accounting for all factors in the 
framework. The ability to model these relationships empirically using good data 
sources helps to define how the methods and data sources of labor market analy-
sis should be developed. However, modeling the whole system is extremely 
complex and so modeling parts of it is the pragmatic solution. When using a 
partial approach, it is important to recognize that modeling only a limited part 
of the system inevitably leads to assumptions being made about the rest of the 
system, and these need to be explicit.
c h a p t e r  2
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The key assumption is that all other aspects of the system do not change. For 
example, many approaches to health workforce planning, including supply and 
demand projections, justify scaling up yet focus only on the orange parts of the 
figure (Scott et al. 2011). They ignore the effects of increasing health workforce 
supply on health care costs and population health. Thus decisions are being made 
without information on the costs or benefits of these large investments, or which 
parts of the population receive the benefits and bear the costs. These issues are 
rarely explicitly addressed.
The framework in figure 2.1 recognizes that the population’s health and well-
being are influenced by a variety of interrelated and dynamic factors, of which 
the health workforce is but one (Dussault et al. 2010). The first point raised by 
the figure is that fewer health workers may be required if health is best improved 
through improved sanitation and other public health infrastructure, or through 
basic education about disease prevention (see the Social and economic determi-
nants of health cell), i.e. many potential policies to improve health do not directly 
involve the health care system. A focus on basic public health measures may 
reduce the need for health workers to treat disease in the future.
The second point is that the relationship between the number of health work-
ers and population health is not straightforward. First, there will be diminishing 
marginal returns for each additional dollar spent on health workers. One might 
expect the marginal benefit (in health outcomes, for example) from training 
Figure 2.1 the role of the health Workforce in the health care system
Source: Scott et al. 2011.
Note: FTE = full-time equivalent; IT = information technology.
Outcomes—Population health, well-being, costs, and equity
Social and economic determinants of health
Education, income, public health infrastructure
(e.g. sanitation), lifestyles, family and social factors, informal care
Outputs—Health care services
Number, type, location, and quality of
visits within the health care system
Inputs—Capital
Buildings (hospitals, aged care facilities,
primary care practices), IT/e-health, 
equipment and medical devices,
pharmaceuticals, supplies
Inputs—Labor
Numbers, FTEs, type, specialty,
age-gender composition,
knowledge, skills, ability
Entrants: graduates, 
migration, other 
occupations
Exits: retirement, emigration, 
other occupations, not in
labor force, deaths
Re-entry
Health care funding
A Framework for Analysis 11
Analyzing Markets for Health Workers • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0224-9 
an additional doctor in the United States to be lower (and the marginal cost 
much higher) than the same investment in training an additional doctor in 
Malawi, assuming the doctor does not migrate from in Malawi. Second, there is 
an assumption that all treatments and procedures supplied by additional health 
workers are effective. In fact, a large proportion of health care services have no 
evidence base for their effects on health or on costs (Berwick and Hackbarth 
2012). More health professionals undertaking the same potentially ineffective 
interventions may not lead to improvements in population health but may still 
substantially increase health care costs.
At the bottom of the figure, health care funding—including the various 
sources of funding and payment mechanisms—influences the quantity of inputs 
and their productivity. How the system is organized defines how inputs are com-
bined within health care organizations, such as hospitals and primary care set-
tings. The demand for health workers is determined by these organizations, 
which in turn are influenced by the needs of patients and the role of health care 
financing in translating need into effective demand.
Health workers require inputs such as physical infrastructure, equipment, sup-
port, and training to provide effective care. These inputs need to be combined 
with other inputs and embedded in organizational structures. Each input has its 
own market that determines the number of inputs and their productivity, of 
which labor is the most important (box 2.1).
Box 2.1 labor productivity
Labor productivity refers to the productivity of health workers and is expressed as the ratio of 
health care outputs (e.g. number of visits) to labor inputs (e.g. hours worked, full-time equiva-
lents [FTEs], or number of workers).
An important concept is the marginal product of labor, defined as the effect of a unit 
change in inputs (e.g. an extra hour worked, extra FTE, or extra worker) on output (e.g. the 
number of visits). An additional hour worked, for example, may lead to the health professional 
seeing three additional patients. The marginal value product is the dollar value of this addi-
tional output, i.e. what employers and patients are willing to pay for the extra output. In a 
well-functioning market, the value of output defines the wage rate of health workers and the 
prices of other inputs.
In health care, the concept of the marginal value product is more difficult to define and 
measure since outputs are not valued in monetary terms, but are nevertheless valued by 
patients as they influence quality of care and health outcomes. Market failures mean that the 
link between the value of services provided to patients and wages is, at best, weak (see follow-
ing subsection).
Labor productivity (and the marginal product of labor) is not only influenced by hours 
worked but also by a range of other factors, including the age and gender of workers, their 
education, skills, abilities, and the level and method of payment. Some health professionals 
box continues next page
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Changes in input mix can also influence the cost of health services without 
influencing population health and well-being. A different way of combining dif-
ferent inputs may reduce costs while maintaining population health. Such effi-
ciencies can release resources to be used for other more productive purposes. 
Increases in the costs of inputs (e.g. earnings of the health workforce) mean that 
fewer other inputs can be used in a system with fixed overall budgets, or may 
mean that health care costs overall rise with no change in the population’s health 
and well-being.
Some of the relationships in the system are illustrated by the figure’s dashed 
arrows. For example, the number and type of health care services influence the 
population’s health and well-being, but population health and well-being also 
influence the demand for the number and type of health care services.
Equity of access and issues of financial protection can be examined in the 
framework by examining the distribution of population health and well-being, 
health care services, costs, and inputs (hospitals and primary care services) across 
different population groups (e.g. rural and urban, high and low income).
Figure 2.1, then, provides a descriptive structure of the health workforce and 
the health care system. But it says little about how the labor market for health 
care services operates—this is addressed in the next subsection.
market Forces and market Failure in health Workers’ labor markets
Summary: The aim of this subsection is to summarize how labor markets work, and 
in health care, how market failures can prevent these markets from working well. The 
building blocks of the market are supply, demand, wages (prices), and market forces 
that move prices and quantities to equilibrium. In a well-functioning labor market, 
the demand and supply of labor tend to move to equilibrium, where the market 
“clears.” The wage rate plays a central role because it directly reflects the market value 
of output produced.
can see more patients in an hour because they may be more experienced, or because they are 
paid fee for service rather than a salary.
Labor productivity can also change because of new ways of using and combining exist-
ing  labor and capital inputs (a different production process) to provide more outputs, or 
where existing and new labor and capital inputs are combined in such a way as to require 
fewer inputs to produce a similar level of output. The productivity of a health worker is also 
influenced by the productivity of other health workers, especially since they usually work in 
teams. So although the skills and aptitude of a health worker may not alter, his or her pro-
ductivity may be influenced by new technology or by changing productivity among 
colleagues.
Box 2.1 labor productivity (continued)
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Markets can fail because prices are inflexible or because either demand or supply 
is constrained from responding to price signals. The consequences of market failure 
mean that government intervention is required to try and ensure good outcomes at 
reasonable cost. Markets can also fail for reasons related to the nature of demand in 
health care. The asymmetric information between patients and health workers 
means defining “demand” is problematic such that wages and payments made to 
health workers may not reflect consumers’ and employers’ preferences as they would 
in a well-functioning labor market. This has implications for how labor economics 
can be applied to health care labor markets.
Understanding the operation of these markets therefore helps define which govern-
ment policies in the health care labor market may be necessary.
Well-Functioning Labor Markets
In a well-functioning labor market the demand and supply of labor tend to move 
to equilibrium, where demand equals supply and there are no shortages or sur-
pluses as the market “clears” due to market forces that are driven by changes in 
the behavior of employers on the demand side and of health workers on the 
supply side. The building blocks of the market are supply, demand, wages 
(prices), and market forces that move prices and quantities to equilibrium. In 
terms of labor demand, employers with a fixed budget can employ fewer work-
ers if wages rise or can employ more workers if wages fall. In terms of labor sup-
ply, the number of workers will increase if higher wages are offered. How 
employers and workers respond to wage signals is therefore a key part of how 
market forces operate.
For example, if the demand for health workers were to rise, say due to 
increases in the prevalence of disease, a shortage of health workers would occur. 
The increase in disease prevalence would be translated into an increased willing-
ness to pay or demand for health workers, as their value in the market rose. This 
higher willingness to pay would raise the price paid for health workers (their 
wage), lifting the supply of health workers in two ways.
First, it would provide incentives to increase hours worked for existing 
health workers and increase workforce participation for health workers cur-
rently unemployed or not working for other reasons. Second, it would make 
the job of health worker more attractive relative to other occupations, leading 
to an increased supply of those training to become health workers. However, 
as supply increases and more people decide to become health workers and 
enter the market, the marginal or additional value of each extra health worker 
(the wage rate) will fall and the rate at which health workers enter the market 
will also fall back to the equilibrium wage, where supply once again equals 
demand.
Market forces therefore operate through the wage rate (price), which reflects 
the willingness to pay (demand) for a health worker. The wage rate influences 
how many hours health workers are willing to supply, and how many individuals 
choose to become health workers relative to entering other occupations. 
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The wage rate therefore plays a central role in labor economics because it directly 
reflects the market value of output produced.
Labor Markets in Disequilibrium and Market Failure
Disequilibrium in well-functioning labor markets described above is short lived.
Wage rates that are too high or too low provide incentives to employers and 
health workers to alter their behavior such that equilibrium is restored. 
Unemployment (where wages are too high and supply is greater than demand) 
or shortages (where wages are too low and demand is greater than supply) will 
be eliminated. But the operation of the market this way, especially of market 
forces, depends on a number of assumptions which, if they do not hold, can 
 create persistent disequilibriums and inefficiency.
These assumptions are centered on whether wages and the quantity of work-
ers are free to adjust. This in turn depends on the existence of institutions that 
determine wages; restrictions on entry into the labor market for new workers; 
workers having the same information about jobs as employers; employers 
 maximizing objectives other than profit; and workers maximizing objectives 
other than income. Often in these models, a range of other factors are held 
 constant, which is a necessary way to simplify complex behavior, but in empirical 
work is the main cause of empirical problems.
Markets can fail because they fail to achieve equilibrium, and for reasons 
related to the nature of demand in health care. Demand for health workers is 
derived from the demand for health care, in turn derived from the demand for 
health (see top left of figure 2.1). In the example above of an increase in disease 
prevalence, it is assumed that those who have the disease know the following: 
that they have the disease; that health workers can provide an effective treatment 
likely restore their health and well-being, and so they seek it; and that the price 
they are willing pay to see a health worker is determined by the value they place 
on restoring their health.
But patients have much less information than physicians about why they 
are ill and the value, effectiveness, and quality of the diagnostic options and 
treatments available (Arrow 1963). This asymmetric information means that 
observing “demand” is problematic. A principal–agent relationship exists: doc-
tors act as agents for patients and provide diagnosis and have knowledge of 
the treatment options and their effectiveness. Though doctors can share this 
information with patients, patients most often place their trust in doctors to 
make decisions on their behalf, especially when they are ill, have low levels of 
education, or are elderly and have multiple morbidities. Though higher-
income and more educated patients are increasingly informed through the 
Internet, they still do not possess the skills and experience of medical 
practitioners.
Thus the demand for health care services and health workers is judged by 
health workers themselves using judgments of “need” rather than by informed 
consumers within a constrained budget. No direct link exists between a con-
sumer’s preferences and prices (willingness to pay and market wages), or at best 
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the link is very weak. Health insurance further weakens price signals. The poten-
tial for health workers to recommend care that increases their earnings and repu-
tations but is harmful or ineffective for patients (supplier-induced demand) has 
led governments to introduce regulation; lengthy periods of training, licensing, 
and accreditation; and regulations on levels and mechanisms for reimbursing 
health workers. Such measures also reduce mobility between countries. Ensuring 
minimum quality standards by restricting entry into domestic and international 
labor markets also keeps wages relatively high and is another form of market 
imperfection in health care.
Consequently, wages and reimbursement levels for health workers do not 
reflect consumers’ valuation of the services provided, as they would in a well-
functioning market. Since wages (and other prices) are unlikely to reflect the value 
of output by consumers, health economists use direct measures of quality of care 
(e.g. mortality rates) and utility-based measures of health outcomes (e.g. quality-
adjusted life years) to reflect the value of output. Wages in health care can 
 provide suboptimal market signals to health workers who will supply too many 
or too few hours, and who will enter or leave the labor market at rates that are 
not related to changes in demand or even need for health care. When financial 
incentives (wages) are not linked to consumers’ preferences, the decisions made 
by health workers on specialty choice, rural-urban choices, migration, and treat-
ment decisions will not be optimal. To the extent that governments represent 
societies’ preferences, government intervention is required to address these 
inefficiencies.
Government steps to curb supplier-induced demand restrict supply, lead-
ing to higher wages and inflexibilities in the labor market such that supply 
takes a long time to respond to changes in demand. Much of this regulation 
of minimum quality standards is delegated to the health workers’ profes-
sional organizations that decide on the numbers entering training programs, 
with the result that supply might be restricted more than optimally. There is 
therefore a trade-off between high wages and ensuring minimum quality 
standards for care, though there is little empirical evidence of the effects of 
licensing (Nicholson and Propper 2011). Subsidizing medical training also 
contributes to excess demand for medical school places. This excess demand 
is persistent and does not lead to more places being offered, and arguably 
maintains physician wages at relatively high levels—another market 
imperfection.
Some differences between country groups emerge: in low- and middle-
income countries, regulation of training and licensing may not be as well 
 established as in high-income countries, and government intervention more 
broadly may be more limited in less well-developed labor markets, and wages 
and  reimbursement may be more responsive to changes in demand and supply 
conditions there. This does not mean, however, that these markets work any 
 better or are more efficient and equitable than high-income countries’ markets, 
as information is even more  asymmetric, especially when there are few minimum 
 quality standards through licensing.
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Policy Interventions and the Health 
Workforce: Economic Issues and 
Evidence
The aim of this section is to examine in more detail the demand and supply sides of 
health worker labor markets, including the empirical evidence of the role and impact 
of policy interventions—in high-income countries and in more depth in low- and 
middle-income countries.
Demand for health Workers
Demand for health workers in a country is largely determined by what 
 governments and individuals are willing to pay for the health care provided by the 
health workforce. The concept of willingness to pay is important and  distinguishes 
demand from “need.” Health workforce needs or requirements are often defined 
by health workforce planners and do not take into account resource constraints, 
nor the effect of extra health workers on productivity or health outcomes. The 
demand for the health workforce, i.e. how many of each type of health worker is 
employed, depends on employers’ (or governments’ or insurers’ or patients’) 
willingness to pay (wage rate) for each type of health worker. In practice, health 
care employers may have an idea of the target number of health professionals 
they require and then decide on wage rates to minimize costs. They will need 
some knowledge of reservation wages, so jobs are attractive to health workers 
compared with other competing job opportunities. Demand is therefore a func-
tion of trends and policies with respect to broader health care expenditures.
Since wage rates do not reflect consumers’ valuation of the services provided, 
how pay levels are set and regulated is therefore an important part of the institu-
tional design of health worker labor markets (Blau and Kahn 1999; Nickell and 
Layard 1999). Some regulation of wages and fees is desirable to keep costs down, 
given extensive market failures. For an organization with a fixed budget, changes 
in relative wage rates will influence the mix of different types of health worker 
c h a p t e r  3
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that can be employed. Skill mix and task substitution are therefore key issues 
when deciding on how many health workers to hire. In addition to the level or 
amount of remuneration, the method of remuneration (e.g. salary, capitation, fee 
for service, and pay for performance) can influence the demand for different 
types of labor.
How Are Wages and Reimbursement Levels Set?
Summary: Health workers’ pay can be determined by market forces or by some 
form of bilateral pay negotiation (between employers and unions) that may be 
centralized. How pay is determined influences the flexibility of wages and the extent 
to which wages help markets clear. Inflexibility can lead to persistent shortages and 
surpluses of labor. Where employers cannot improve pay to resolve a shortage, they 
might use terms and conditions of service; or in some cases, additional allowances, 
such as for rural practice, or for working in a high-cost region. In some low- and 
middle-income countries (LMICs), these issues are exacerbated if civil service pay 
is the same across different public sector occupations.
Some health care labor markets’ wages are flexible and determined by 
 market forces, through charging patients fees that are not covered by govern-
ment or insurer subsidies. Given market failures, this may lead to pay being 
too high and to equity concerns, as those most in need cannot afford the fees. 
Some level of subsidy or regulation may be necessary to counteract the 
effects of these market failures. In LMICs where pay is relatively low, public 
health workers may also charge informally for their services, with similar 
consequences.
Health professionals’ earnings often constitute the main component of health 
care costs. Institutional arrangements that govern funding of health care services 
and price setting play an important role in determining the incentives within the 
system.
The main issue in pay setting is wage flexibility. This is a key assumption 
in labor economics: that wages are flexible and adjust freely to changes in 
demand and supply. If not, equilibrium cannot be achieved and inefficiency 
persists (box 3.1). However, evidence suggests that where these controls 
have been  introduced, providers adjust volumes of care to compensate for 
any loss of earnings (McGuire 2000). In other systems where there are no 
direct price controls and governments and insurers provide a fixed subsidy to 
patients, increases in subsidies can also lead to increased prices such that only 
a percentage of the subsidy is passed on to patients (Savage et al. 2009).
Centralized Pay
Pay bargaining arrangements by which employers and trade unions negotiate pay 
increases and other employment conditions are often used to set pay levels, most 
commonly in the public sector where trade unions are more dominant (Blau and 
Kahn 1999).1 Negotiated wages that are too high encourage a persistent over-
supply of labor as wages are extremely hard to readjust, having been fixed 
through the industrial agreement. Health workers’ trade unions, especially for 
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physicians, often have strong negotiating power with governments that keep 
wages relatively high.
Such centralized pay setting reduces wage flexibility. Compared with the 
private sector, wages will be inflexible and may exhibit little variation across large 
geographic areas or even whole countries, as is the case for the National Health 
Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom. An employer facing a shortage cannot 
raise wages to attract workers, and so relies much more on changing other job 
characteristics, or face persistent shortages.
Local pay setting, in contrast, say at the level of a region or state or even 
employer, allows for pay differences between areas that differ in living costs and 
geographic amenities. In this way, local shortages and recruitment difficulties can 
be resolved. The empirical measurement of the characteristics of jobs under cen-
tralized pay setting then becomes important as these may be the only policy 
levers available to government and employers to attract and retain workers.
Empirical evidence in general and on health worker labor markets has focused 
on the impact of pay rigidities in the public sector due to pay bargaining, and 
their further impact on recruitment and retention problems, the persistence of 
health worker shortages, and productivity.
For example, assume an industrial agreement in the public sector sets wages 
for nurses to be the same across geographic areas, but private sector wages for 
nurses and those occupations that compete for nurses are fully flexible and vary 
across these same areas. If the public sector wage falls relative to the private sec-
tor wage, this will lead to nurses leaving the public sector and working in private 
sector nursing or other occupations, or in other regions where pay is higher. 
Box 3.1 pay Flexibility—the theory of compensating Differences
The theory of compensating (or equalizing) differences is concerned with how the wage rate 
in a competitive labor market reflects the advantages and disadvantages of jobs (Rosen 1986). 
This may include the location of the job, flexibility of hours, the type of tasks undertaken, and 
the types of patients seen. An employer who is offering jobs that have undesirable character-
istics (e.g. working in a remote area or in an area with high costs of living) would need to offer 
higher wages to attract workers, in order to compensate workers for the undesirable character-
istics of the job. Employers offering “good” jobs will usually have no problems recruiting, as 
people are willing to work for lower wages because of the good job characteristics. When 
 individuals choose a job, they therefore trade off wages with other job characteristics.
In this way, the equilibrium market wage captures and reflects all the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of jobs, again highlighting the central role played by wages in labor 
 economics. Where wages are flexible, there is no need to measure or be concerned with other 
job characteristics, as these are captured in the market wage rate in efficient labor markets. 
However, where wages are regulated and inflexible, they may not fully capture the advantages 
and disadvantages of jobs.
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This will occur in regions where costs of living are high or the level of amenity 
is low. In these regions, wages in the private sector are flexible and therefore 
higher than public sector wages to compensate workers for the high costs of liv-
ing and disamenity.
Under pay regulation in health care, this type of flexibility is not possible, and 
has been shown to lead to vacancies and recruitment and retention problems in 
the NHS (Elliott et al. 2007). Further research in England found that pay regula-
tion can also lead to lower productivity overall if highly skilled nurses leave and 
if the reduction in productivity is greater than the increase in productivity 
 provided by the nurses in their new jobs (Propper and Van Reenen 2010). The 
gains from pay bargaining of keeping wage costs down might therefore be offset 
by lower average productivity and quality of care, in addition to persistent health 
worker shortages.
In practice, it is often desirable that bargaining agreements include adjust-
ments in wages for workers in particular geographic areas or particular types of 
job. This may include additional allowances for working in a high-cost area, or 
extra payments for working in rural areas. These allowances may partially offset 
the impact of wage bargaining on recruitment and retention problems. (The 
impact of pay differentials across geographic markets will be discussed in more 
detail in the section on geographic distribution of health workers.)
Centralized pay setting may also be such that the same pay scale is used 
across different public sector occupations. This creates similar problems 
of occupational disequilibriums (a relative inability to recruit and retain 
employees in particular occupations that have more difficult conditions 
such as long hours, or where there are alternative employment opportuni-
ties in the private sector) while also potentially worsening local area 
disequilibriums.
Such arrangements are quite common in low-income countries’ health labor 
markets, or where health workers are considered civil servants and employed on 
civil service pay scales. The prevalence of bonus and allowance arrangements in 
these circumstances suggests that health workers require higher earnings than 
other types of civil servants to keep them in the public sector. While this helps 
to resolve the larger problem, it creates others. The fact that such payments are 
usually flat rate—equal for all points on a pay scale—serves to compress pay 
scales, with consequences for the ability to retain more skilled or experienced 
health workers. Recognition of these problems led the Zambian government, for 
example, to embark on an experiment that sought to “delink” health workers 
from the civil service, but this ultimately foundered on conflict with the civil 
service union, which successfully blocked the attempt (Hongoro and Normand 
2006; Makasa 2009).
Evidence on Public Sector Pay Issues from Low-Income Countries
One study addressed in more depth the public sector demand side of the health 
labor market (Vujicic, Ohiri, and Sparkes 2009). Using case studies of the 
Dominican Republic, Kenya, Rwanda, and Zambia, it looked at the role of 
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the government’s overall wage bill policy in determining health workforce staff-
ing levels in the public sector. In all four countries, the health sector wage bill is 
set separately from other types of health expenditure and it is not open to the 
Ministry of Health to allocate across labor and other inputs at the margin. The 
demand for health professional labor is therefore generally set by central 
 government, outside the Ministry of Health.
In the Dominican Republic, Kenya, and Rwanda, the health sector 
accounted for a rising share of the wage bill for periods between 2000 and 
2007, reflecting priorities for the health sector, and this trend was also evident 
in most of a larger set of countries for which similar data were analyzed. 
However, only in Rwanda of the four case study countries was the overall size 
of the wage bill maintained over this period: in the others, spending was 
 significantly reduced.
In Kenya, the reduction in spending was judged to have limited the expansion 
of the health workforce. In Zambia, the situation was difficult to judge owing to 
concurrent processes to “delink” health staff from the civil service, but the main 
constraint to health workforce expansion was judged not to be fiscal. Herbst 
et al. (2011) also considered the fiscal space for human resource financing in 
Zambia and documented its constraints. In Rwanda, the health workforce was 
 successfully expanded (and the stock increased by 30% over a three-year 
period), and some of the costs for this were transferred to Ministry of Health 
budgets through a process of performance-based grants (Vujicic, Ohiri, and 
Sparkes 2009). In the Dominican Republic, expanding the health workforce was 
not a policy objective, but wage bill restrictions had constrained growth in salary 
levels with postulated implications for dual practice and hours worked in the 
public sector.
Because this report, alone among those we identified, documented in some 
depth the demand side of the public sector labor market, it is possible to reach 
some tentative conclusions about the state of labor market disequilibrium in 
each of the four countries. Kenya appears to have had unemployment or a situ-
ation of disequilibrium with surplus labor: demand is constrained by macroeco-
nomically driven restrictions on the public sector wage bill as a whole, and pay 
rates do not adjust downwards to bring the market into equilibrium. 
Unemployment among qualified health workers is significant. Zambia appears 
to be in a state of labor shortage: demand existed for health professionals who 
were not available to fill posts and pay rates did not adjust upwards to bring the 
market into equilibrium. While the analysis of Herbst et al. (2011) tends to 
 support this conclusion for Zambia, it also points to the role played by the 
demand side in constraining pay rates and other conditions from adjusting 
upwards—on balance, a conclusion of disequilibrium may require further 
research on the relative roles of demand (fiscal space) and institutions in 
 constraining wage rate flexibility.
The Dominican Republic appeared to have the most flexible effective pay 
rates as health workers’ unions negotiated reductions in hours to reflect their 
inability to secure pay increases, bringing into alignment constraints on demand 
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with reduced supply. The Rwandan health labor market may also exemplify the 
market clearing model—few health workers are unemployed and the health 
workforce expanded in line with growing effective demand.
McCoy et al. (2008) establish the wide variability in structures and levels of 
public sector pay (absolutely and relative to living standards and private sector 
pay) in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is argued that pay levels fell during the structural 
adjustment period of the 1980s and early 1990s outside Francophone Africa, 
with data cited to this effect from Tanzania (and more generally for civil 
 servants for 26 of 32 Sub-Saharan African countries between 1986 and 1996), 
and that concomitantly, nonwage benefits increased proportionately (although 
the data cited on this point are from Senegal, inside the Francophone group of 
countries). In the same period, it is argued that wage compression resulted 
from the award of greater pay increases to lower paid groups alongside the 
growing importance of flat rate allowances, which would be expected to result 
in the exit of the most skilled employees at the upper end of the scale to occu-
pations, sectors, and locations where pay scales are less compressed. However, 
in Ghana, Mozambique, and Uganda, specific policies were introduced to 
decompress civil service pay scales in the 1990s. This highlights the importance 
of changes in the distribution of pay and pay scales, and the impact on recruit-
ment and retention.
Health Workers Charging Patients Directly for Services: Price Regulation and 
Informal Payments
Some health labor markets leave pay largely to market forces, where health 
workers can work in private practice and charge fees directly to patients. But 
with asymmetry of information and the possibility of supplier-induced 
demand, this approach is likely to result in payments greater than the value of 
the services provided and may lead to inequality according to need. Patients 
most in need of health care are usually the poor and disadvantaged. They will 
not be able to afford the prices charged or will face very large health costs 
when ill. Insurance and government subsidies of fees, if available, may make 
services more accessible and so address equity concerns, but do not address 
the efficiency loss caused by prices (and therefore health workers’ earnings) 
being higher than their actual value to patients and society. To control fees, 
direct regulation—and therefore negotiation of fee increases between health 
worker trade unions and governments or insurers—is often used (although as 
seen, providers may adjust volumes of care to compensate, [McGuire 2000], 
and higher subsidies may result in only a portion passed on to patients 
[Savaage et al. 2009]).
In low-income countries where there is little pay regulation, or where 
 public sector wages are very low, there may be incentives for health workers 
to charge informally for the services they provide. McCoy et al. (2008) note 
the importance of private income sources in health workers’ incomes. These 
further complicate the concept of price as some sources, such as informal 
charges or dual practice income, may be derived from or enhanced by the 
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health worker’s primary employment, while others, such as income earned 
from agricultural work, are unrelated. The first type of (related) private 
income sources may be conceptualized as resulting in a divergence of the price 
paid by the employer and that received by the employee, and indeed this was 
seen to be among the rationales for the tolerance of dual practice that has 
been identified in other studies (Eggleston and Bir 2006; González and 
Macho-Stadler 2013).
Akwataghibe et al. (2012) report in detail on the nature of private income 
sources in two states of Nigeria and find the most significant sources as among 
those derived or enhanced by public health sector employment: undertaking 
activities that attract per-diem payments, informal charging, and reselling medi-
cines pilfered from health facilities. Overall, supplementary sources were highly 
significant: more than 50% of health workers derived more than 50% of their 
incomes from them.
Gaal, Evetovits, and McKee (2006); Onwujekwe et al. (2010); and Hunt 
(2010) analyze the processes of informal payments in Hungary, Nigeria, and 
Uganda, respectively. Gaal, Evetovits, and McKee (2006) estimate informal pay-
ments in Hungary at 1.5–4.6% of total health expenditure, suggesting a minor 
role as a source of finance. However, its impact on distribution of financial 
returns to health workers could be huge: some specialists were estimated to earn 
60–236% of their net official income through informal charges in 2001.
In Nigeria, Onwujekwe et al. (2010) find that 65% of the expenditure for 
malaria treatment reported by consumers was not reported by providers. Of 
particular interest in this paper is that such differences were not confined to 
public facilities, suggesting that health workers in the private sector may also 
charge sums beyond those reported to employing institutions, and that the return 
to employment in private facilities may not be wholly captured by the official 
salary there too. This finding needs to be interpreted with some caution, however, 
as the study assumes that all differences between expenditures reported by 
 consumers and providers are informal charges, whereas other explanations, such 
as a tendency to overstate expenditure by consumers, might apply.
Hunt (2010) finds that informal charges have reemerged in the postformal 
user-charge situation of Uganda and identifies the existence of informal charges 
in the private sector too, although at slightly lower levels than in the public 
 sector. However, in the analysis of this paper, private sector “bribes” appear to be 
predominantly payments by those suffering from respiratory or sexually trans-
mitted diseases, who, according to official policy, should be exempted in the 
private not-for-profit sector, if they fail to be offered official exemption. This may 
well not be retained by the employee in the private not-for-profit sector, and may 
therefore not affect the return to labor supply there.
The analysis of Barr, Lindelow, and Serneels (2009), generated by an experi-
mental game played by Ethiopian nursing students, fails to find an expected 
reduction in the tendency to expropriate or charge informally, in response to an 
increased wage rate. Clearly, this can only provide preliminary and provisional 
evidence on this point.
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Skill Mix, Task Substitution, and Elasticity of Demand for Health Workers
Summary: With a fixed budget, employers need to decide on what mix of workers to 
employ in order to achieve their objectives. This will be determined by relative wage 
rates and the extent to which workers with given sets of skills can undertake the tasks 
required.
Though working in teams is necessary in many health care contexts, there is little 
empirical literature on the role and nature of teams in influencing health outcomes 
and costs. Skills may complement each other in undertaking a specific task, or differ-
ent health workers may be substitutes if they can undertake a specific task but are 
paid differently.
Incentives to change skill mix depend on the extent to which employers have a fixed 
budget, which is not always the case in the public sector or where defined professional 
boundaries limit role change. Technological change can also influence the demand for 
different types of health worker and the value of different sets of skills and how they 
are combined. Empirical evidence of the determinants and effects of skill mix change 
is, however, limited.
Skill mix refers to the potential to substitute tasks and roles between different 
types of health worker. (Its importance was identified in figure 2.1.) It is also 
relevant to health workers operating in teams. Some tasks require only one type 
of labor input, e.g. a doctor, who has a range of skills that are applied to a range 
of tasks depending on their specialty. A single labor input can also be combined 
with other inputs, such as a nurse, or capital and technology, such as a drug or 
procedure. This combination may increase costs and output, and this greater 
output may be valued more highly if it leads to improved quality of care and 
patient health status. Or the new input may lower costs by reducing the time it 
takes to treat a patient (e.g. fewer visits are required), thereby enabling the physi-
cian to increase output overall.
For a hospital or physician practice producing a given number of health care 
services at a specific level of quality, the mix of physicians, nurses, allied health 
professionals, administrators, and equipment (or technology) will depend in 
part on the extent to which they work together and combine their skills to 
undertake specific tasks, which generate a jointly determined output. The skill 
sets of different labor inputs may overlap, such that doctors and nurses can 
undertake some of the same tasks, thus creating opportunities for substitution. 
For example, both doctors and nurses can take blood pressure readings, admin-
ister drugs, and take blood samples, but in hospitals, nurses undertake these 
tasks as it is more cost effective for them to do so. Or skills and tasks may be 
specialized but complementary, for example, a surgeon cannot operate without 
an anesthetist.
The hospital or physician practice may also have a limited and fixed budget, 
or have incentives to minimize the costs of producing health care services. The 
number of full-time equivalent physicians demanded is determined by their 
wage rate, and the prices of other inputs, which include the wages of nurses, 
other health professionals, and administrative staff, as well as the cost of capital 
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and equipment. In the same way, the number of full-time equivalent nurses is 
determined by their wage rate and the prices paid for other inputs. Recall that 
the wage rate reflects a worker’s value and productivity in a well-functioning 
market. The most efficient mix of labor inputs (plus equipment) is therefore 
determined by their relative productivity as reflected by their relative wages. 
In health care, wages may not reflect the value of labor productivity and so the 
optimal degree of substitution and complementarity will be determined by the 
effects of different skill mixes on cost, productivity, and health outcomes.
Two concepts are important here. The first is the elasticity of demand for a 
health worker, or the extent to which the number of health workers demanded 
changes as the wage rate changes. If wage rates of doctors rise, the hospital can 
employ fewer doctors with a fixed budget; if wage rates fall, it can seek to employ 
more. The second is the cross-price elasticity of demand between inputs. This is 
a measure of the extent to which different inputs are substitutes or comple-
ments. If wages of doctors rise, this influences not only the number of doctors 
demanded but can also influence the number of nurses and equipment 
demanded, if doctors and nurses are substitutes or complements. There are, how-
ever, no empirical estimates of these elasticities in health care.
To achieve optimal skill mix within an organization, strong incentives are 
needed to minimize costs, or to maximize the benefits of skill mix change. This 
may not always be the case in the publicly funded health care sector. Different 
methods of reimbursement can influence the demand for health workers. Fee-
for-service payment is often linked to physicians providing the services them-
selves, and this provides fewer incentives for the use of nurses, allied health 
professionals, and physician assistants. Capitation payment—a fixed payment per 
patient that provides a prospective fixed budget—provides incentives to mini-
mize costs for each patient. Systems with capitation such as the NHS in the 
United Kingdom and managed care organizations in the United States are more 
likely to employ nurses and physician assistants and other health workers as they 
have more flexibility to use the funds in different ways that enable them to 
 minimize costs (Nicholson and Propper 2011).
The substitution of tasks of different cadres of health workers has become 
central to much health workforce policy. In health care, however, in addition to 
few incentives for skill mix change, there is much inflexibility in substitution due 
to regulation and licensing of professions. Clear boundaries between professional 
groups are enshrined in culture and law. Though nurses may possess the skills to 
undertake a range of tasks undertaken by doctors, this is often not permitted, 
meaning that it is illegal in most countries for nurses to prescribe medication, for 
example. Even within health professions, doctors cannot easily switch between 
specialties and undertake the tasks of other doctors. Doctors with similar levels 
of specialty training in one country cannot often practice in another country, 
without lengthy periods of retraining or supervised practice.
Hospitals as employers often therefore have little flexibility to undertake sub-
stitution, as this may require changes to legislation and/or industrial agreements. 
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This inflexibility leads to persistent inefficiency and again highlights the trade-off 
between licensing and regulation to maintain minimum quality standards that 
define clear roles, tasks, and responsibilities, and thus to increases in health care 
costs due to inefficiency. So although wage rates and earnings may change, this 
often leads to little change in skill mix in the health sector as doctors and nurses 
are employed in essentially fixed proportions that change little over time com-
pared with other industries (Nicholson and Propper 2011). There are examples 
where new cadres of health worker have emerged, such as physician assistants in 
the United States, though it is less clear whether these are substitutes, comple-
ments, or are dealing with previous unmet need and so represent additional costs.
Technology and Skill Mix Change
Technological advancement and its impact on labor inputs are often discussed 
separately. For example, in health care, the focus is usually on the relationship 
between different labor inputs, such as doctors and nurses who work in teams. 
In these analyses, technology is assumed to be exogenous. Given the inflexibility 
of substitution between different labor inputs, skill mix change and changes 
in the types of tasks performed by health workers are most often driven by 
technology-based inputs that influence the demand for labor inputs (Acemoglu 
and Autor 2011). For example, organizations have a specific set of tasks that need 
performing to produce outputs, and then choose workers on the basis of the skills 
that can perform the tasks (Acemoglu and Autor 2011).
Technological change can alter the productivity of all workers across all tasks, 
or of some workers in specific tasks, or introduce new tasks. There may be 
 different ways to undertake a specific task that use different skills and technolo-
gies, and a different set of tasks to produce an output or change total productiv-
ity. One reason why we might observe changes in wages rates over time, and in 
wage differentials between different types of health worker and occupations, is 
that technological change requires different sets of skills and a changed allocation 
of tasks. This in turn influences the value of those skills and tasks in terms of 
changes in wage rates (Acemoglu and Autor 2011). This assumes that wages 
reflect the value of the output.
Evidence of the Effects of Skill Mix Change
There have been few economic studies of changes in skill mix in health care. 
Though in labor economics and national labor markets, skill mix change can 
be analyzed using changes in wage rates (Acemoglu and Autor 2011), we have 
already established that similar analyses in health care that assume that wages are 
flexible and reflect the value of output may produce erroneous results. A number 
of randomized trials and economic evaluations of skill mix change focused on 
doctor–nurse substitution. The value of output in these studies has been mea-
sured using health outcomes and quality of care. Systematic reviews of these 
studies have found that nurses provide similar levels of quality of care and health 
outcomes, and for a similar cost, since nurses often have longer consultations 
than general practitioners (Kernick and Scott 2002; Laurant et al. 2004).
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This is also the conclusion of studies in LMIC contexts that have considered 
the planned and resourced reallocation of tasks from higher to lower cadres (in 
contrast to unplanned ad hoc substitution arising from unfilled vacancies in 
health teams). For example, comparisons of nonphysician clinicians and doctors 
in performing obstetric surgery in South Africa, Vietnam, Malawi, and Ethiopia 
suggested similar postoperative outcomes (Chilopora et al. 2007; Gessessew et al. 
2011; Warriner et al. 2006). Similarly, Huicho et al. (2008) showed that health 
workers with shorter training performed at least as well and sometimes substan-
tially better than those with longer training in assessing, classifying, and managing 
episodes of routine childhood illness and in counseling the children’s carers in 
Bangladesh, Brazil, Tanzania, and Uganda. On the other side, Hounton et al. 
(2009) found significantly higher newborn case fatality rates when cesarean 
 section was performed by clinical officers rather than by obstetricians and general 
practitioners.
supply and productivity of the health Workforce
In labor economics, the level of remuneration and the methods by which it is 
delivered are predicted and can be shown to play a role in influencing labor 
 supply and worker behavior. Applied to health care, financial incentives are 
expected to influence a range of decisions from occupational choice to retire-
ment to which drug to prescribe, all of which have implications for the number 
of health workers, the hours they work, and their distribution across countries, 
specialties, sectors, geographic locations, and health outcomes and health care 
costs. These behaviors also influence access to health care by the population.
The market failures discussed earlier—particularly wage rates not reflecting 
consumer preferences, but also supply restrictions to ensure minimum standards 
and other market imperfections—mean that the expected signals provided by 
financial incentives are unlikely to help achieve an efficient level of supply or 
distribution of health workers, as seen in the many countries with persistent 
shortages of health workers.
The empirical evidence on the impact of financial incentives in health care 
suggests that they sometimes play a relatively moderate, though statistically 
 significant, role in health workers’ decisions. In addition to market failure and 
other labor market imperfections in health care, this provides another reason 
why the centrality of wages, earnings, and incentives as policy instruments in 
labor economics is regarded by some as less useful when applied to health care 
labor markets.
The key reason is that most health workers do not care only about earnings 
and consumption, but also about other parts of their utility function, such as 
patients’ health outcomes. Theoretical models of physician behavior in health 
economics have long recognized this (Ellis and McGuire 1990), and concepts 
such as intrinsic and prosocial motivation have recognized a much richer set of 
motivations that drive behavior and that have been applied to health worker 
behavior by psychologists (Frey and Jegen 2001; Rebitzer and Taylor 2011). 
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The existence of these other nonpecuniary motivations also makes it important 
to examine heterogeneity in behavioral responses to incentives, and to capture 
other nonpecuniary factors that influence decisions and that can be altered by 
nonwage policies.
Education, Training, and Specialty Choice
Summary: Economists would argue that the main factor influencing career choices in 
health care, especially for medical practitioners, is expected lifetime earnings. A focus 
on earnings in the literature assumes that they capture the “value” to the individual 
and society of work in that career path or specialty, although there has been little 
application of this in health economics so far, perhaps because of the weaker link 
between earnings and health outcomes, productivity, or value to society in health care 
labor markets.
The distribution of doctors across different specialties is a particular issue, 
given relative shortages of primary care physicians versus specialists. Evidence 
suggests that the specialty that doctors choose is influenced by differentials in 
economic returns as well as by other nonpecuniary factors. However, there is much 
less consensus in the literature on which nonpecuniary factors matter.
The choice to become a health worker, and subsequent career paths (includ-
ing specialty choice), is predicted to be influenced by expected lifetime  earnings, 
as well as individuals’ skills and other expected job characteristics. Expected 
lifetime earnings from different occupations and from different levels and types 
of education and skill acquisition is a central concern of labor and education 
economics (Card 1999). There is large literature on the “returns to education” 
and skills, which attempts to identify the effect of different levels and types of 
education on earnings. Again, a focus on wages is due to an assumption that 
wages reflect the social returns (i.e. the benefits to society of training and 
employment) and market value of services provided and so, according to this 
assumption, there is no need to directly measure the effects of education and 
skills on productivity or the quality of services provided, as these are reflected in 
the market wage. These types of analysis also capture the private returns to edu-
cation (i.e. the benefits to the individual of training and employment) that 
depend on an individual’s characteristics and preferences.
Different lengths of training, graduate versus undergraduate training, and 
training doctors in rural locations, are all issues that can influence future earn-
ings, the quality of care provided, and other choices such as whether to work in 
a rural location. There has been some economic analysis on the private returns 
to different types and lengths of health worker education. Most of this literature 
has focused on nursing and the move from an apprenticeship model based 
largely in hospitals, to undergraduate degree training, or comparing registered 
nurses to less qualified nurses (e.g. enrolled nurses) (Cunich and Whelan 2010; 
Spetz 2002).
There is little literature on the returns to different types and lengths of educa-
tion for doctors (Burstein and Cromwell 1985), even though there has been 
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a move in some countries to shorten undergraduate and specialist training and 
introduce graduate-entry medical degrees. Most research on the returns to medi-
cal education for doctors has focused on the returns to working in different 
specialties (Cheng et al. 2012; Langwell 1982). Specialty choice is a key issue in 
many countries since there is broad agreement on a long-term imbalance of 
 specialists and primary care physicians. Indeed, the development of primary care 
as a separate specialty has also been an issue in many LMICs, as well as in the 
United States. This maps onto a concern about doctors being concentrated in 
hospitals in urban centers and being reluctant to practice in community-based 
settings outside major hospitals.
Earnings of specialists are persistently much higher than primary care or com-
munity health workers, especially where private practice is the dominant model, 
and again, medical specialists have much longer periods of training than primary 
care physicians, constituting barriers to entry. The period of training is deter-
mined by medical colleges, which also decide on the number of training places 
to offer, therefore restricting supply for some specialties, often unrelated to popu-
lation need.
Differentials in economic returns influence specialty choice. The literature has 
focused on physicians and the role of future earnings and other factors influenc-
ing such choice (Nicholson 2002; Sivey et al. 2012). These studies show that 
although earnings do play a role in specialty choice, so do other factors such as 
medical education, debt, and flexibility of hours. However, there is much less 
consensus in the literature on the role of nonpecuniary factors.
Carnoy et al. (2012) estimate returns to higher education in the BRIC 
 countries (Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, and China) and find large dif-
ferences between them. In Russia between 1998 and 2001, private rates of 
return to medical education were negligible for men but comparable to the 
returns to higher education in law, engineering, and humanities for women. 
Higher returns to women reflect the poor job opportunities for women with-
out higher education relative to men. Private rates of return declined over the 
period as tuition fees increased. In Brazil, private rates of return to medical 
education were high, but not as high as other higher education investments. 
Medical education was not considered separately from other higher education 
in China and India.
Our search did not find studies calculating the rates of return to any type of 
health professional training in low-income countries, though some recent quali-
tative work suggests that rates of return may be limited by shortcomings in train-
ing institutions (Celletti et al. 2011; Ferrinho et al. 2011).
Workforce Participation and Hours Worked
Summary: Higher wages are assumed to provide an incentive to work more hours 
and to encourage workers currently not working to choose to work. Empirical evi-
dence suggests that changes in the level of pay influences hours worked and workforce 
participation. There is also the possibility and some evidence of doctors on relatively 
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high incomes working less, as they prefer to take more leisure time when earnings 
increase.
Examining how changes in wages influence hours worked and labor force 
participation is a central concern of labor economics (Blundell and Macurdy 
1999). Structural labor supply models assume that workers, in determining the 
number of hours they work, are motivated by their income and leisure. In labor 
economics, these issues are driven by policy changes in taxation and welfare 
benefits that influence wage rates and then labor supply. A key concept is the 
elasticity of labor supply, which measures the responsiveness of hours worked to 
changes in wages. Higher wages are assumed to provide an incentive to work 
more hours and to encourage workers currently not working to choose to work. 
Often, a focus of studies examining the effect of wages on labor supply is on the 
labor supply of women and the role of children in their preferences for income 
and leisure. Models also involve dynamic and intertemporal labor supply deci-
sions, where individuals attempt to make decisions about hours worked over 
their lifetime.
There is also the possibility of a “backward-bending” labor supply and a nega-
tive labor supply elasticity by which an increase in wages causes a fall, rather than 
an increase, in hours worked. This happens because wage changes affect income 
and the rate of substitution between leisure and income. Under normal 
 conditions, the substitution effect dominates the income effect, such that a wage 
rise leads to the marginal utility from the additional income from working an 
extra hour being greater than the utility from an extra hour of leisure—an 
increase in wages therefore leads to an increase in hours worked. If the income 
effect dominates the substitution effect, the increase in income is sufficiently 
large that the worker has a higher utility from an extra hour of leisure than from 
an extra of work, and so hours worked fall.
Labor supply elasticities are therefore important pieces of information that 
help assess the effectiveness of changes in wages and translate them into changes 
in hours worked, and then into changes in the number of health workers 
employed.
In health care, labor supply models have been estimated from a policy concern 
about the general impact of changes in wages on the labor supply of doctors and 
nurses. The driving policy concern has therefore not been about taxes or welfare 
benefits, but about the impact of changes in regulated wages and fees that are 
often the subject of pay negotiations between government, insurers, and health 
workers’ professional organizations.
Changes in the level of pay have been shown to influence hours worked and 
workforce participation of doctors and nurses (Antonazzo et al. 2003; Baltagi, 
Bratberg, and Holmås 2005; Hanel, Kalb, and Scott 2012; Sæther 2005; Shields 
2004). The impact of higher hourly earnings is to increase hours worked and 
workforce participation, with this effect being relatively small, but usually 
 statistically significant, in most labor supply models for both doctors and 
nurses. There is little strong evidence of backward-bending labor supply: weak 
evidence can be observed in aggregate data in several countries where the 
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average hours worked and the number of patients seen by doctors are falling 
while remuneration levels and prices are increasing (Scott 2006; Whalley, 
Gravelle, and Sibbald 2008).
Qin, Li, and Hsieh (2013) use census data to estimate the labor supply 
response (weekly working hours) of health professionals to changes in the hourly 
wage rate when considering policies of increasing wages or increasing training 
opportunities as alternative responses to rising demand for services in China. 
Their analysis contrasts self-employed health professionals (who have relative 
flexibility in setting their working hours) and employees (who are much more 
constrained). Their results suggest supply elasticities in response to the hourly 
wage rate of 0.575 for self-employed health professionals (for a 1% increase in 
the wage rate, a 0.575% increase in numbers of hours worked) and 0.02 for 
employees (virtually no supply response). The authors attribute the difference to 
constraints on employees’ ability to increase and reduce hours worked at the 
margin.
Qin, Li, and Hsieh (2013) note that their result for self-employed health pro-
fessionals constitutes a high degree of elasticity relative to estimates for countries 
in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and 
one that may underestimate the longer-term response of reducing constraints to 
labor supply adjustment. They conclude that greater upward flexibility of health 
professional pay, which is constrained by regulation in the Chinese health system, 
may be a more cost-effective policy option than investment in health profes-
sional education as a means of increasing labor supply, and that it may slow 
health price inflation, which they assume reflects the increasing shortage of 
health professionals in the system.
Migration and Retention
Summary: Wage differentials influence retention of health workers, both in specific 
jobs and in relation to out-migration. Higher wages reduce attrition and induce 
health workers who would choose to migrate at current salary levels to remain in 
their jobs. However, this relationship becomes more inelastic at higher levels of salary 
increases, suggesting that policy tools aimed at enhancing recruitment and retention 
of health workers should not be restricted to salary improvements alone. Job attri-
butes equally play an important role with no single job attribute dominating. 
Empirical evidence provides a mixed picture of the impact of wage differentials on 
migration.
Migration
Using payroll data from the government of Ghana, Antwi and Phillips (2013) 
find elasticities of attrition from the public sector payroll of around −0.1 for 
younger health workers identified as potential migrants (a 10% increase in 
wages reduces annual attrition by 1% from its 8% base level), but insignificant 
or marginally significant effects for other groups. They suggest that their results 
indicate that the effect of wage rates on retention operates largely through 
migration.
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Using a different approach (contingent valuation), Serra et al. (2010) find a 
fairly consistent response over a range of 40–300% salary increases, namely that 
each increase of about 40% of the current salary level induces a further approxi-
mately 5% of nurses (who would otherwise have migrated at current salary lev-
els) to stay in Ethiopia. Responses are highly inelastic to further salary increases 
beyond 300%, however, with 30% of nurses choosing to leave Ethiopia if given 
the chance, irrespective of Ethiopian salary levels (Serra et al. 2010, 42, 
 figure 6.1). For doctors, salary increase increments of about 30% of the current 
salary level each induces 3–4% of doctors to stay (who would otherwise have left 
in the near term), but the relationship becomes more inelastic to further salary 
increases above 240% of the current level, and almost completely inelastic to 
further salary increments above 500%: at that point, 85–90% of doctors would 
choose to stay in Ethiopia (Serra et al. 2010, 43, figure 6.2).
In contrast, Vujicic et al. (2004) in a survey of health professionals in six 
African countries fail to find a relationship for wage differentials between 
migrant origin and destination countries, on the one hand, and the prevalence of 
intention to migrate, on the other. They suggest that the universally large gap in 
wages between migrant origin and destination countries may explain why rela-
tively small differences in origin countries’ wage levels have limited explanatory 
power, and advise that countries aiming to limit migration may need to focus on 
nonwage instruments. This study did not disaggregate health professionals by age 
and internationally scarce skills as Antwi and Phillips (2013) did, and may con-
sequently have missed finding the relationship in the most likely affected 
subgroup.
International recruitment policies and health labor market forces have played 
an important role in fueling the out-migration of health workers from LMICs 
(WHO 2006). Changes in population demographics as well as in international 
labor market forces and economic conditions have partly contributed to a grow-
ing demand for internationally trained health workers in high-income countries 
(Pond and McPake 2006). For example, in the United Kingdom, the sharp 
increase in health expenditure of the NHS in 1998 resulted in a rise in the 
demand for internationally trained health workers. In the United States, capacity 
restrictions in U.S. medical schools after the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
resulted in a fall in the supply of domestically trained medical doctors, with a 
resulting increase in absorption of internationally trained health workers (Pond 
and McPake 2006).
To meet this growing demand, high-income countries have used various 
strategies for recruiting international health workers, including relaxing immi-
gration policies and licensing requirements (Bach 2007; Birrell 2004; OECD 
2002; Runnels, Labonte, and Packer 2011). For example, the U.K. government 
in 2001 embarked on an advertising campaign to recruit internationally trained 
doctors and nurses; by 2003, the number of doctors and nurses had grown 
annually by around 21% and 20%, respectively, with international recruitment 
accounting for 80% of the growth in the number of doctors and 73% of the 
growth in the number of nurses. Of the additional overseas-trained physicians 
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registered during 2002 and 2003, 24% came from Sub-Saharan Africa (Pond 
and McPake 2006).
Recognizing the adverse impact of their international recruitment policies 
on the health workforce of LMICs already experiencing shortages of quali-
fied health workers, high-income countries adopted international recruit-
ment codes of practice and bilateral agreements to limit such recruitment 
(Kurowski et al. 2012; Runnels, Labonte, and Packer 2011; WHO 2010). 
However, the impacts of these policies remain unclear, partly because of the 
difficulty in identifying the impact of a code among other policies (Buchan 
et al. 2009). For example, although the U.K. Department of Health in 2001 
set out guidelines restraining the active recruitment of health workers from 
150 countries, including countries in Africa and the Caribbean (despite the 
concurrent advertising campaign mentioned above) (Department of Health 
2001, 2004), the number of Caribbean-trained nurses registered to practice 
in the United Kingdom grew by 40% between 2001 and 2005 (World Bank 
2009) while the number of Sub-Saharan Africa–trained doctors registered to 
practice in the United Kingdom tripled between 2001 and 2003 (Pond and 
McPake 2006). However, by 2006, international recruitment had declined in 
the United Kingdom, partly reflecting changes in general immigration poli-
cies and in professional licensing requirements for professional health 
 workers entering the country (Buchan et al. 2009).
Retention
Three studies were undertaken through the Regional Network for Equity in 
Health in East and Southern Africa (EQUINET) in Tanzania, Swaziland, and 
Kenya. The first two focused on nonfinancial incentives; the third considered 
financial incentives as well.
In Tanzania, Munga and Mbilinyi (2008) found that nonfinancial incentives 
have the potential to significantly affect health workers’ willingness to stay in 
their posts but that ineffective implementation of such incentives limits their 
practical impact. Examples included the lack of transparency in allocating pro-
motions and training opportunities, and the inadequate provision of benefits, 
such as stipulated housing entitlements. Masango, Gathu, and Sibandze (2008), 
in Swaziland, found nonfinancial factors positively associated with retention: job 
satisfaction, a perception of equality of treatment by the employer, the discretion 
that health workers felt they had in carrying out their role, and the opportunity 
that role gave to help others.
Ndetei, Khasakhala, and Omolo (2008) also found nonfinancial incentives 
highly valued in Kenya, and documented the disparity of financial and nonfinan-
cial incentives between rural and urban areas. In part, this disparity stemmed 
from the ability of better organized facilities, often in higher income areas, to 
adopt measures introduced to retain health workers.
In Senegal, Rouleau et al. (2012) found some correlation between elements of 
a job satisfaction survey and job search activity and turnover, using a longitudinal 
study of midwives. In the West Nile region of Uganda, Onzubo (2007) found low 
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salary to be overall the most frequently estimated reason for attrition by health 
staff who remained in public and private not-for-profit hospitals, although in 
public hospitals, political and managerial explanations were more frequently 
offered.
Penn-Kekana et al. (2005) (for three provinces in South Africa with high 
vacancy levels) and Mangham and Hanson (2008) (for Malawi) used discrete 
choice experiments (DCEs) to evaluate the role of different job attributes in 
retention and related human resources outcomes in the health sector. Both 
studies found that no single job attribute dominated employment preferences 
of South African nursing and midwifery staff or Malawian public sector–regis-
tered nurses, and that almost all were willing to trade among attributes. In 
South Africa, good management and a well-equipped hospital were as impor-
tant to nurses as a 15% pay increase. In Malawi, opportunities to upgrade 
qualifications, provision of government housing, and pay had the greatest 
impact on the utility associated with a particular job. Mangham and Hanson 
(2008) conclude that a range of policy instruments is available to influence 
Malawian nurses’ motivation, recruitment, and retention, beyond salary 
increases.
In Vietnam, Witter et al. (2011) found four “directions of travel” over the 
course of health professionals’ careers, militating against the retention of health 
professionals in public, rural, preventive, and primary service provision, moti-
vated mainly by financial incentives.
Dual Practice
Summary: The dual practice literature consists almost entirely of two types of mate-
rial: descriptive statistics and theoretical analysis. While some theoretical studies 
suggest that allowing dual practice might increase social welfare and improve quality 
in the public sector, others suggest that quality might fall in the public sector as physi-
cians skimp on hours or have incentives to redirect profitable patients to their private 
practice. However, these theoretical models have yet to be tested empirically.
The allocation of resources across public and private health sectors is a con-
tentious issue in most countries, including the extent to which doctors and other 
health workers undertake work in both sectors. Standard approaches in labor 
economics do not address these issues directly, as they assume that workers 
choose the highest paying job and that employers discourage their workers from 
supplying their labor to other firms (Eggleston and Bir 2006).
The dual practice literature consists almost entirely of two types of material: 
descriptive data and theoretical analysis, with very limited use of theory to ana-
lyze data or use of data to test or generate theory. Socha and Bech (2011) pro-
vide a review of the theoretical literature and highlight the need to test the 
assumptions that drive it, such as income maximization, as it seems to fit poorly 
the descriptive empirical observation that exists. Almost all the literature consid-
ers only dual practice among doctors; evidence on other cadres such as mid-
wives, who have also been identified as dual practitioners, is almost entirely 
absent.
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Eggleston and Bir (2006) review five models of dual practice. Most are 
 consistent with either positive or negative relationships between dual practice, 
social welfare, and quality in the public sector, implying a need for more empiri-
cal evidence.
Eggleston and Bir (2006) also provide some analysis of the fit of theoretical 
models with the limited empirical evidence. For example, they argue that docu-
mented government attitudes to dual practice support the theoretical idea that 
allowing dual practice enables government to recruit quality providers at modest 
budgetary expense, and other evidence (including some from Bangladesh) 
 supports the argument that dual practice has the greatest value to more specialist 
health professionals. They cite a World Health Organization study (Hicks and 
Adams, 2001) to support a postulated negative correlation between public salary 
levels and prevalence of parallel income-generating activities by health profes-
sionals, including dual practice. Nevertheless, Eggleston and Bir (2006) find very 
limited empirical evidence to compare with theoretical predictions, searching 
even further back in the literature (to around 1990) than we have (to 2006).
More recent reviews of the broader literature confirm that there is much 
descriptive analysis and debate, but hardly any empirical studies that examine 
the impact of changes in dual practice on health care costs and health outcomes 
(González and Macho-Stadler 2013; Socha and Bech 2011). González and 
Macho-Stadler (2013) argue that there is little consensus in the literature on the 
net effects of dual practice on costs, quality of care, health outcomes, and access 
to care. This is reflected in a wide variety of arrangements to regulate dual prac-
tice, either through bans on it, improved contracts for public sector employment, 
or limits on the amount of hours or earnings from private practice. The authors 
note that these regulations are most prevalent in high-income countries, with 
dual practice largely unregulated in many LMICs.
The theoretical models reviewed by Eggleston and Bir (2006) and the more 
recent discussion of González and Macho-Stadler (2013) tend, however, to ignore 
the consequences of market failure in health care. They assume that physicians in 
private practice have higher levels of skill, are more productive, and provide care 
that is more highly valued than physicians in the public sector— presumably 
because they have higher wages than those in the public sector, and this would 
be the case in a well-functioning labor market. Under these assumptions, banning 
or restricting dual practice leads to the most productive physicians moving to the 
private sector, and these effects may be worse in low-income countries, given the 
larger gap between the sectors (González and Macho-Stadler 2013).
However, these conclusions do not hold if the link between earnings and the 
value of services provided is equally weak in both sectors because of market 
failure. Though physicians may be more productive in some cases, this may not 
translate into their being more skilled—it may rely on better resource availability. 
In addition to market failure, these models ignore other motivations such as 
higher-skill physicians caring more about patients’ health status than income, and 
therefore preferring to spend more time in the public sector where, typically, 
patients have a higher need for health care services.
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The public sector typically has less ability to increase wages to attract physi-
cians from the private sector, and so wages could remain low compared with 
those in the private sector, creating persistent disequilibrium and recruitment 
problems in the public sector. The size of these problems will depend on the 
extent of the between-sector differences (González and Macho-Stadler 2013), 
which are likely to be larger in low-income than high-income countries. As we 
have seen, public sector wages may be centrally determined or part of a civil 
service pay scale. There may be little scope for pay to reflect performance, and 
little opportunity to progress up the salary scale. The private sector will usually 
be based on fee-for-service payment where the volume of care is related to 
income, thereby providing incentives to see more patients and to have higher 
productivity levels than in the public sector.
The public sector may therefore focus on nonwage aspects of jobs to attract 
health workers from the private sector, including offering the opportunity to 
undertake private sector work, the amount of which could be regulated to main-
tain time spent in the public sector. But the public sector could also offer some 
doctors the intellectual challenge of academic work that can enhance their repu-
tations, and allow them to work with different groups of patients. Doctors may 
though prefer private sector work because they have more autonomy.
Conditional on the regulations on dual practice, the issue then becomes 
whether the allocation of time between sectors can be changed to improve popu-
lation health at least cost. Long waiting lists and times at public sector facilities, 
or a high need for health care among groups that do not currently access health 
care, may be evidence of a shortage of doctors in the public sector, especially 
when private sector waiting times and lists are short or those patients being 
treated in the private sector are more healthy and less in need of health care.
The need to encourage doctors to allocate more time to the public sector 
therefore becomes an important objective of government policy. A doctor who 
transfers a session (say, a half-day) of work from the private to the public sector 
will improve the health of patients if the marginal health gain of the additional 
session in the public sector is greater than the health gain given up in the private 
sector. In a well-functioning market, this would be reflected by a higher hourly 
wage in the public sector. But of course in health care, wages are not related to 
marginal health gains in either the public or private sector, and so if doctors care 
more about income or other factors than patients’ health they will not reallocate 
their time even though health gains are larger in the public sector. As said, design 
of effective policy interventions to achieve this requires an understanding of the 
factors that can potentially influence doctors’ decisions about how they allocate 
time across the sectors.
What is clear from the González and Macho-Stadler (2013) model is that 
policies that ban or restrict dual practice could potentially lead to doctors 
leaving or spending less time in the public sector. However, how much they 
do that depends on how much they are motivated by income or other 
 attractions of private practice, the transactions costs of moving, and the dif-
ferences in job characteristics between the two sectors. If the doctors who 
Policy Interventions and the Health Workforce: Economic Issues and Evidence 37
Analyzing Markets for Health Workers • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0224-9 
leave produce greater health gains in the private sector than they did in the 
public sector, these regulatory policies will not improve efficiency in the 
public sector, but population health may be higher from a societal point 
of view.
Some studies report significant levels of dual practice in various settings. Both 
Gruen et al. (2002) (Bangladesh) and Jumpa, Jan, and Mills (2007) (Lima, Peru) 
document beliefs and attitudes among dual practitioners; Jumpa, Jan, and Mills 
(2007) find income generation the prevalent explanation, although they identify 
other benefits including skills development and greater exercise of clinical 
autonomy. Gruen et al. (2002) estimate incomes earned and consultation fees 
and find the latter significantly associated with the degree of specialization, 
 surgery or hospital admissions, and employment of own staff, while 17% of the 
sampled doctors reported earning between two and four times as much in the 
private as the government sector. Predictors of total income levels included age, 
time in practice, employment of own staff, and (negatively) employment in 
a  primary health care facility.
Russo et al. (2013) (Praia, Cape Verde; Bissau, Guinea-Bissau; and Maputo, 
Mozambique) evaluate the factors associated with the decision to engage in dual 
practice and find significant associations with years as a physician, having a spe-
cialization, age, and period working outside the capital city.
Both Jumpa, Jan, and Mills (2007) and Russo et al. (2013) identify categoriza-
tion problems in different forms of private sector activity undertaken by public 
sector doctors, and the phenomenon of private sector activity within public 
 sector premises. Russo et al. (2013) conclude that where this option is available, 
it appears to limit dual practice in the form of private practice outside public 
sector premises, and is perhaps preferred because it removes the need to invest 
in separate private clinics.
Two articles focus on regulation of dual practice. González and Macho-
Stadler (2013) provide a theoretical framework considering the implications of 
different regulations. The main conclusion is that limiting dual practice will be 
more effective if the focus is on limiting earnings rather than limiting activity, 
but as discussed above, this conclusion is contingent on the normal operation of 
market forces—in this case, that the private market is able to recognize and 
reward ability. Garcia-Prado and Gonzalez (2007) document the experience of 
different types of regulation in a range of settings, and conclude that implemen-
tation of regulations poses such difficulties that it is impossible to evaluate 
impact. Successful regulatory experience is only documented in high-income 
countries, although as discussed, encouraging the development of private prac-
tice in public facilities is also prevalent in low-income countries, but with 
unknown impact.
Geographic Distribution of Health Workers within Countries
Summary: Shortages in areas of high need for health care, including rural areas and 
areas that include socially and economically disadvantaged populations, indicate that 
local labor markets in health care do not operate efficiently. A compensating wage 
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differential approach highlights the role of the relative advantages and  disadvantages 
of local areas.
Many countries have a range of policies and programs to encourage doctors to 
locate and practice, even temporarily, in underserved remote and rural areas. These 
include financial and nonfinancial incentives, restrictions on mobility such as manda-
tory practice in rural areas for immigrant health workers, bonded training schemes, 
and restrictions on entry to overserviced areas.
Despite a considerable literature identifying factors that influence the recruitment 
and retention of doctors in remote and rural areas, to date there exists little rigorous 
evidence about which policies or programs are the most effective in increasing the sup-
ply of doctors to underserved areas, and more specifically the amount of incentive 
required to encourage doctors to move.
In geographically defined labor markets, whether a country or regions within 
a country, differences in earnings and other job characteristics as well as charac-
teristics of geographic areas should in theory influence the mobility of workers 
between areas. Where wages are flexible, reflect the value of services provided, 
and there are no transaction costs of moving, a shortage in one area will push up 
wages offered in that area relative to other areas. This will lead to workers mov-
ing into that area until the wage falls back to spatial equilibrium.
In labor economics, interest in local labor markets is driven by attempts to 
explain differences in productivity, wages, and employment across spatial labor 
markets, and how changes in demand and supply conditions in local labor 
 markets, or in the aggregate, have differential effects across local areas (Moretti 
2011). In health care, interest in geographic distribution is driven by the percep-
tion of persistent shortages that lead to concerns of equity of access to health care 
in addition to concerns about efficiency. Shortages in areas of high need, includ-
ing rural areas and areas that include socially and economically disadvantaged 
populations, indicate that local labor markets in health care do not operate 
 efficiently. A compensating wage differential approach highlights the role of the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of local areas. For example, in rural areas 
there are typically longer working hours, higher levels of being on call, and the 
need to work in relative professional and social isolation.
A previous section on pay setting highlighted how centralized wage bargain-
ing can lead to persistent shortages. However, even where wages are flexible, in 
rural areas, diseconomies of scale lead to high unit costs of production and make 
it less profitable for firms to locate there, which may be efficient from the firm’s 
perspective, but in health care, a concern for equity of access will lead to 
 arguments for government intervention. There are two key reasons for govern-
ment intervention: to compensate workers for the disadvantages of jobs and 
areas, and to subsidize the provision of health services that have high unit costs 
because of diseconomies of scale.
Many countries have a range of policies and programs to encourage doctors to 
locate and practice, even temporarily, in underserved remote and rural areas. 
These include restrictions on mobility such as mandatory practice in rural areas 
for immigrant health workers, bonded training schemes, or regulations restricting 
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entry to overserviced areas. Financial or nonfinancial incentives are also used in 
many countries to encourage health workers to move to underserviced areas and 
to stay in those areas. For example, short-term contract-based employment 
and high-remuneration packages have been used as policy tools in Turkey and 
Indonesia to attract health workers to rural areas (Rokx et al. 2010; Vujicic, 
Sparkes, and Mollahaliloglu 2009).
Imbalance in distribution of clinical schools has been highlighted as a deter-
minant of the inequitable rural–urban distribution of health workers; the estab-
lishment of rural clinical schools may prove an important policy tool (Raha, 
Berman, and Bhatnagar 2009a). Other recent policies include exposure to rural 
practice during training and targeted recruitment of health workers who grew up 
in rural areas. Government intervention may also attempt to reduce the transac-
tions costs of moving. These include family factors such as schooling and employ-
ment for a partner, and assistance with the costs of establishing a small business.
While different combinations of financial and nonfinancial incentives have 
been used to attract health workers to rural posts, lower economic conditions and 
standards of living prevailing in rural areas represent important challenges for 
retaining health workers there (Rao et al. 2010; Rokx et al. 2010). This raises 
questions about what types of incentives or combination of them will  compensate 
health workers for the loss of utility associated not only with the  characteristics 
of rural jobs but also with the socioeconomic characteristics of rural areas. 
Despite a wide literature identifying factors influencing recruitment and reten-
tion of doctors in remote and rural areas, to date there exists little rigorous evi-
dence about which incentive policies or programs are the most effective in 
increasing the supply of doctors to underserved areas, and more specifically 
the amount of incentive required to encourage enough of them to move 
(Barnighausen and Bloom 2009; Buykx et al. 2010; Grobler et al. 2009). These 
systematic reviews found very weak evidence of effectiveness (but many poor 
study designs).
Lemiere et al. (2011) make the relatively neglected point that a key factor in 
the underrepresentation of health staff in rural areas is low effective 
demand there. Low incomes and consequent lower willingness and ability to 
pay restrict the profitability of for-profit providers, the scope for sustainability 
of  not-for-profit providers, and the potential for fee income of public providers. 
In the public sector, fiscal centralization restricts the funding for public sector 
services. Supply of health professionals to rural areas, or the relative willingness 
to work there, is argued to be differentiated by type of health professional and 
other health worker characteristics such as gender and family circumstances, 
but to be on balance lower than the supply to urban areas, even with higher 
compensation.
However, evidence from Ethiopia (World Bank 2008) suggests that in prac-
tice, monetary compensation to health workers is higher in urban areas, consis-
tent with the arguments of Ndetei, Khasakhala, and Omolo (2008) (for Kenya) 
and Witter et al. (2011) and Vujicic et al. (2011) (for Vietnam). Serra et al. 
(2010) find that doctors in Ethiopia earn more in rural areas than in urban areas, 
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and nurses only slightly (and statistically insignificantly) more in urban areas. 
It is unclear why the evidence of World Bank (2008) and Serra et al. (2010) for 
the same country at a similar time is contradictory.
Designing incentives to encourage doctors to locate and remain in remote 
and rural areas requires an understanding of the various factors that motivate 
their location decisions. In the absence of data on revealed preferences, DCEs 
are increasingly used. While Penn-Kekana et al. (2005) and Mangham and 
Hanson (2008) used DCEs to address the issues of motivation and retention, 
others have used the same approach to understand the opportunities and costs 
of incentivizing health workers to rural jobs, and the results of the earlier 
reported studies could be used to assess alternative strategies for incentivizing 
them in this way.
Vujicic, Alfano, and Shengelia (2010), for example, found that while the level 
of pay was the most important job attribute for nurses in Liberia, opportunities 
for further study were most important for doctors in Vietnam. Translating this to 
a cost-effectiveness analysis confirmed that the most cost-effective strategy to 
increase recruitment in rural areas was increasing pay in Liberia and improving 
opportunities for further study in Vietnam. The Liberian and Vietnamese studies 
derived the list of attributes used in the DCE by prior qualitative work (Attah 
et al. 2010; Witter et al. 2011).
Lagarde, Blaauw, and Cairns (2012) took a similar approach in South Africa, 
first using DCEs to understand the elasticities of nurses’ labor supply to rural 
areas in response to policy controlled variables, and then calculating the cost-
effectiveness of the policies. Their analysis found that the most cost-effective 
intervention was to select nursing students more likely to accept rural posts—an 
option not considered by Vujicic, Alfano, and Shengelia (2010)—followed by an 
offer of preferential access to specialist training. Vujicic et al. (2011) further 
 analyzed the differences in values of job attributes expressed by those who were 
(or were not) looking for a new job, had lived in a rural or urban area prior to 
starting medical studies, and whose parents had (or had not) graduated with a 
university degree. The lowest values for an urban job location were expressed by 
those who were looking for a new job, originated from a rural area, and whose 
parents had not graduated from university.
Kruk et al. (2010) used a DCE to explore the job attributes that would per-
suade Ghanaian medical students to accept a rural post. Improved infrastructure, 
supportive management, and a 100% salary bonus were the most important 
predictors, and all three combined predicted that 90% of respondents would 
choose a rural post.
Lori et al. (2012) found dominance of training opportunities for midwifery 
students in Ghana in choosing between urban and rural work alternatives, and 
Appiah-Denkyira et al. (2013) report that for three-year diploma nurses, a fixed 
term of two years followed by study leave was the dominant job attribute pre-
dicting choice of a rural post. Similar results have been reported by Raha, 
Berman, and Bhatnagar (2009b) in India. Using semi-structured interviews, they 
showed that compared with other nonfinancial incentives such as increased 
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training opportunities, good housing, and faster promotions, the most attractive 
incentive was a 50% reservation in a postgraduate course on completion of the 
rural posting: over 80% of undergraduate medical students who would otherwise 
have pursued a postgraduate degree on graduation were willing to accept a two- 
or three-year rural posting if offered that. Similar results were observed with 
nursing students.
Hanson and Jack (2010) report results of a DCE among doctors and nurses in 
Ethiopia, finding that nurses are more responsive to pay levels than doctors, but 
relative to pay, place a higher value on working in Addis Ababa relative to 
 alternatives than doctors do. There are, however, difficulties in interpreting these 
results as the alternatives offered were not identical: nurses chose between Addis 
Ababa and a rural location that could be quite remote, whereas doctors chose 
between the capital and a regional town. Furthermore, pay responses were rela-
tive to current pay levels, which were of course lower for nurses than for doctors. 
Further modeling of the factors influencing the values stated found significant 
roles for marital status, sex, children, current location, current housing, and inter-
actions between these variables.
Comparing the DCE studies described in the preceding section suggests the 
following: that generalization about the relative importance of financial and 
 nonfinancial incentives is unwarranted; that financial and training-related incen-
tives may prove most important in many settings—although training-related 
incentives were not included in the study by Hanson and Jack (2010); and per-
haps that financial incentives are likely to be more important in the poorest set-
tings (Ethiopia and Liberia rather than the middle-income context of Vietnam) 
and for lower cadres (nurses rather than doctors). The latter two suggestions 
provide hypotheses for comparison with further evidence.
The two incentives that are often important (financial and training incen-
tives) were found to be juxtaposed in Ethiopia by Serra et al. (2010). For doc-
tors, pay was found to be higher in urban areas while training opportunities were 
more constrained. For nurses, the reverse was the case with rural pay similar or 
slightly lower in rural areas but training opportunities greater. Serra et al. (2010) 
also used a contingent valuation approach, similar to a DCE, but focused only 
on determining the salary at which nurses and doctors would accept a post in a 
rural area. To attract 80% of nurses and 65% of doctors to a rural post, salary 
levels of 284% and 245% of the current levels, respectively, were estimated to 
be required.
Productivity and Performance
Summary: Productivity and performance can be influenced by monetary and nonmon-
etary rewards. Most evidence concerns the implications of different forms and struc-
tures of monetary reward. Payments can be made to the health provider in exchange 
for working for a specified time period (e.g. salary, sessional payment); for providing 
specific services, treatments, and episodes (fee for service); for providing care for a 
patient or specific population (capitation); and for providing a pre-specified level of 
quality of care or health outcomes (e.g. performance-based pay). Payments are also 
42 Policy Interventions and the Health Workforce: Economic Issues and Evidence
Analyzing Markets for Health Workers • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0224-9
characterized by different distributions of risk between health care provider and 
employer or funder.
“Pay for performance” programs are attempts to reform payment structures so as 
to improve productivity and share risk. Types of payment mechanism perceived as low 
risk and low incentive in practice use a combination of financial and nonfinancial 
rewards over the longer term.
The Impact of Remuneration on Productivity and Performance
The existence of a principal–agent relationship between doctors and patients 
means that much of the literature in health economics is focused on designing and 
evaluating optimal payment mechanisms for health workers, mainly physicians 
(Malcomson 1999; Prendergast 1999). The mechanism needs not only to ensure 
the efficient supply of hours, but also to provide incentives for increased perfor-
mance, from the agent, which aligns with the principal’s objectives. Designing 
incentive-compatible contracts requires that the principal’s objectives can be met, 
while ensuring that the contract is attractive enough to agents. These contracts 
depend on the extent to which performance and productivity can be observed.
A key part of this literature is multitasking, which recognizes that complex 
jobs such as medicine may not be suited to strong performance-incentive 
 measures. This is due to the wide range of different tasks and the inability, or 
sometimes high costs, of measuring performance along all dimensions. There may 
be unintended consequences of performance monitoring and measurement, such 
that it is difficult to assess if efficiency overall has improved (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom 1991). With such multitasking, performance incentives for measurable 
activities may divert efforts from equally important but unmeasurable aspects of 
performance. In medicine, which already has a high level of intrinsic motivation 
to improve health outcomes, the need for such strong incentives is diminished 
(Mooney and Ryan 1993).
In addition to the incentives concerning the level of wages that are the focus 
of traditional labor economic models, incentive contracts that encourage effort 
and performance focus on different types and methods of remuneration and 
employment contracts. These are also more suitable in health care environments, 
where many health workers may not be paid a salary and are self-employed in 
private practice. Self-employment coupled with fee-for-service payment, capita-
tion payment, or pay for performance may all have different effects, not only on 
hours worked but also on the allocation of those hours across different  treatments 
and types of patient, as well as effects on health outcomes and costs. Though fee 
for service, salary, capitation payment, and pay for performance are the main 
methods of payment, they can also differ depending on other characteristics of 
the payments (Scott et al. 2011).
•	 Payments can be made in exchange for the following provider behaviors: 
working for a specified time period (e.g. salary, session payment); providing 
specific services, treatments, episodes (fee for service); providing care for 
a patient or specific population (capitation); and providing a prespecified 
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level, or increases in the level, of quality of care or health outcomes (e.g. 
 performance-based pay).
•	 Payments may be linear or nonlinear: linear, so the same payment is made for 
each additional unit of payment (e.g. service provided); or nonlinear, such that 
payment is conditional on reaching a threshold or target, or a series of thresh-
olds, or that the amount of the payment changes with each additional service 
provided.
Payments may also be risk adjusted. Capitation payments provide incentives 
to minimize costs, which provide incentives to select only the healthiest patients 
to treat. Capitation payments can therefore be risk adjusted to avoid providers 
choosing less complex patients to treat (cream skimming), which is an unin-
tended consequence of this form of payment. Risk adjustment often weights the 
payments per patient for the expected costs of treating that patient. For example, 
elderly patients may attract higher payments than younger patients.
Payments can also be based on administrative rules, such as seniority. This is 
likely to be reflected in salary payment with automatic annual progression 
between increments on the scale to reflect accumulated experience. This may be 
relatively efficient where performance cannot be easily observed or measured 
(Prendergast 1999).
The timing of payments may be in advance (prospective payment that pro-
vides a fixed overall budget) or once performance can be measured and payment 
adjusted. Such retrospective payment can be capped or unlimited with respect 
to the total payments that can be made. Once the cap is reached, either no fur-
ther payments are made or the amount of the unit payment is reduced.
Another key feature of payment systems is the extent of risk sharing between 
providers and employers or funders (Ellis and McGuire 1990). Uncapped fee for 
service means that patients or funders are exposed to the full financial risk of any 
change in the volume of care provided. In this setting, providers have few incen-
tives to control costs. At the other extreme, capitation payment shifts the financial 
risks largely to the provider, who must absorb the additional costs of patients with 
complex and expensive health problems. Incentives for cost control by providers 
are high. The degree of risk sharing influences the strength of the incentives.
A combination of the above approaches is often regarded as efficient as it 
avoids the extreme incentives of each single method (Robinson 2001). Pay for 
performance is usually added to an existing method such as salary payment or 
fee for service. However, the efficient mix of different methods of payment 
depends on the context.
There is also a large literature examining changes in the method by which 
health professionals—mainly doctors—are paid. Cochrane systematic reviews 
have all found that different methods of payment influence clinical behavior and 
the quality of health care, although the effects are small and the evidence is 
mixed and of variable quality (Eccles et al. 2010; Gosden et al. 2000, 2001; 
Scott et al. 2011).
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Compared with salaried and capitation payment, fee for service encourages a 
higher volume of care provided. There is an emerging consensus that such 
 payment does not encourage optimal care for patients with chronic disease, and 
there are payment models introducing blended payments that include a capita-
tion payment and an element of pay for performance as part of “medical homes” 
and accountable care organizations in the United States (Merrell and Berenson 
2010). These have existed for some time in the United Kingdom for general 
practitioners who received 25% of their earnings through the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework pay for performance system (Roland 2004). Such models 
require standardized measures of performance that are only possible with other 
interventions, including information technology infrastructure and agreed guide-
lines on treatment options for specific diseases.
The reported doubts about the effectiveness of systems such as pay for 
 performance are concerned not only with the poor methodological design of the 
studies themselves, but also with the poor design of the systems (Campbell et al. 
2010). Avoiding unintended and undesirable consequences—there may also be 
some unintended but desirable consequences (Sutton et al. 2009)—can be partly 
achieved through careful design and implementation. For example, payments 
should be risk adjusted to avoid selecting healthy patients so as to properly com-
pensate providers for high-cost patients. Exception reporting, where providers 
can exclude patients from the denominator of payment calculations, can be 
avoided by paying only for the numerator, i.e. a payment per patient hitting a 
target rather than for the proportion of patients hitting a target (Twardella and 
Brenner 2007). Schemes should also reward measured improvements in quality 
between two periods rather than the achievement of a given level of quality 
(Young, Scott, and Best 2010).
Performance-based pay has been promoted extensively to improve health 
worker performance in LMICs (Loevinsohn and Harding 2005), and its effec-
tiveness has been tested in a range of settings (some examples include Basinga 
et al. 2011; Lundberg, Marek, and Pariyo 2007), with some evidence that it can 
improve performance. However, there are concerns about the methods applied. 
Most studies evaluate the implementation of multiple interventions introduced 
in parallel and cannot distinguish the effects of each (Eichler, Levine, and 
Performance-Based Incentives Working Group 2009; Galvin 2006). In addition, 
most evidence derives from rather rudimentary program evaluation, making it 
“difficult to distinguish proven findings from enthusiasm and marketing” 
(Galvin 2006, 127S).
The Impact of Incentives within Career Structures on Productivity and 
Performance
The field of personnel economics blends the findings of labor economics with 
human resource management, recognizing that the structure of careers and pro-
motion within organizations can also influence incentives for effort and advance-
ment (Gibbons and Waldman 1999). Incentives in the general labor market are 
heavily influenced by organizations that focus on their own internal labor market; 
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in particular, where individual performance in complex jobs is difficult to observe 
and measure, incentives within career structures become more relevant.
Promotion hierarchies are contained within structures of salary scales and 
increments, and how they are combined. With subjective performance 
appraisal methods, these can create incentives for improved performance 
(Prendergast 1999). Economists view promotion as a competitive process, and 
so the design of “promotion tournaments” becomes important in providing 
incentives for worker performance (Lazear and Rosen 1981). This also has 
implications for team-working in organizations and how incentives within 
teams operate.
Though salaried payment is often criticized for having no incentives for addi-
tional effort or the provision of quality of care, once this is examined in a 
dynamic context (i.e. promotion next year depends on performance now), it 
becomes clear that financial incentives can exist to gain promotion and advance-
ment. Incentives for performance are therefore embedded in salary scales for 
employees (with gaps between each increment in the scale) and in promotion 
opportunities, creating financial incentives for improved performance and for 
clear definition of career trajectories.
For some health professionals, these career structures are not well developed 
and so incentives are not strong for increased performance. Unions prefer 
equity of pay through “short” pay scales with small gaps between each incre-
ment, while employers prefer longer scales with larger gaps and larger wage 
spreads to encourage higher and increasing levels of performance. Comparing 
the distribution of wages within firms therefore provides information on the 
extent to which pay might be linked to performance. There is evidence on 
these issues in other industries, but very little in health care (Mavromaras and 
Scott 2005).
Salaried payment and promotion are also prone to bias and “currying favor” 
with superiors, which may explain the limited use of merit-based promotion and 
advancement in low-income countries’ health systems, in which transparency of 
promotion processes is particularly difficult to achieve and the legitimacy of the 
judgments to be made are thus open to question. There is evidence from such 
contexts that health workers dislike performance-based reward and prefer 
seniority (time-served) promotion criteria (for example Ssengooba, McPake, and 
Palmer 2012).
Health Worker Motivation
Summary: Health workers are motivated by factors other than money. “Pro-social,” 
“ intrinsic,” and “public service” motivation have all been used to recognize that other, 
nonpecuniary, aspects of work, jobs, and organizational goals matter in explaining 
economic behavior.
LMICs have been a focus of studies on motivation largely outside the economics 
literature. For example, health workers in Benin and Kenya reported that alongside 
predictable constraints, features of organizational culture that penalized them for 
deviating from norms of working practice also influenced their motivation.
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As seen, health workers are motivated by factors apart from money. Given 
that wages may not always be flexible or reflect consumer preferences, these 
other factors will not be captured by wages and are therefore important to exam-
ine in their own right. Though this topic departs from traditional labor econom-
ics approaches, there is a growing literature in behavioral economics that deals 
with the more detailed motivations of individual decision making, and borrows 
many concepts from psychology and neuroscience (Fehr and Falk 2002; Rebitzer 
and Taylor 2011).
At the heart of many studies of the effects of financial incentives on physician 
and health care provider behavior lies a utility function that includes not only net 
income (profit) but also patient’s health status or utility (Ellis and McGuire 
1990; Evans 1984; Feldstein 1970; McGuire 2000; Siciliani 2009). Physicians’ 
preferences for net income and patients’ health status, and how they may be 
traded off, are a key source of variation in their responses to financial incentives, 
and were at the heart of debates in the 1970s and 1980s on supplier-induced 
demand and the principal–agent relationship.
More broadly, there may also be other arguments in the physician’s utility 
function such as intellectual stimulation, reputation, the intrinsic motivation 
from doing a good job, and other characteristics of the job (Scott 2001). 
Presumably, physicians with a relatively low marginal utility of net income attach 
a higher marginal utility to other aspects of work and life, including the intrinsic 
features of medical practice, altruism, and improving patients’ health.
The relative importance of these will influence the response to incentives and 
therefore the design of remuneration schemes. This has been shown in theoreti-
cal models. Financial incentives may not work for doctors with a relatively low 
marginal utility of income and a high concern for patients’ health, or the financial 
incentive may need to be higher to elicit a response. In particular, if a physician 
places a relatively heavy weight on improving patients’ health, there is a need for 
much less complex remuneration and payment schedules (Mooney and Ryan 
1993).
A parallel literature has also developed within behavioral economics that rec-
ognizes both the importance and richness of sources of motivation other than 
income, and that concepts from psychology can be used to enhance the explana-
tory power of economic models. Pro-social, intrinsic, and public service motiva-
tion have all been used to recognize that other, nonpecuniary, aspects of work, 
jobs, and organizational goals matter in explaining economic behavior (Fehr and 
Camerer 2007; Fehr and Falk 2002; Frey 1997; Frey and Jegen 2001).
In addition, in the new field of neuroeconomics, the prefrontal cortex in the 
brain has been shown to play an important role in resolving conflicts and trade-
offs between selfish and pro-social rewards (Fehr and Camerer 2007). This 
newer literature fits neatly into the older health economics literature about phy-
sicians caring not just about income but also about patients’ health status.
Though these issues have been recognized in theoretical models in health 
economics for decades, empirical economics work on measuring these issues is in 
its infancy. Pro-social motivation has been measured in laboratory experiments, 
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but only one paper has used medical students in such an experiment to measure 
the degree of altruism (Godager and Weisen 2011). They examine the marginal 
rate of substitution between profit and patient health benefit for 42 medical 
students. Unsurprisingly perhaps, altruism was found to be important and the 
majority of students placed more weight on altruism than profit, but with sub-
stantial heterogeneity in the degree of altruism among all students.
More studies have examined heterogeneity in the monetary motivation of 
physicians in an indirect way, by using proxy variables. Rizzo and Zeckhauser 
(2003, 2007), for instance, use a question in a survey that asks doctors what they 
think their income should be given their career stage, and define this as a refer-
ence (or target) income. They show that those whose actual income is below this 
reference income have stronger growth in income over time, and show that 
women do not respond to reference incomes.
Iversen and Lurås (2000) use information from the introduction of a capita-
tion scheme in Norway, where general practitioners had to state the preferred 
number of patients on their list. General practitioners who were allocated less 
than their preferred number of patients (i.e. a shortage of patients) were found 
to provide more services to their patients. Whynes, Ennew, and Feighan (1999) 
examined “entrepreneurial” motives among general practitioners deciding 
whether to become fund holders (i.e. hold their own devolved budget to pay for 
hospital services and prescribing) in the United Kingdom. They used a 21-item 
instrument measuring entrepreneurial traits, and found that these traits influ-
enced that decision.
The growing literature on DCEs is also a source of evidence on the contents 
of physician utility functions and heterogeneity in their preferences for 
income. Some of these studies have examined the extent to which the mar-
ginal utility of income varies across subgroups of physicians. The marginal 
utility has been found higher for males (Chomitz et al. 1998; Wordsworth 
et al. 2004), for those with less experience (Scott 2001), and for older doctors 
(Ubach et al. 2003).
In LMICs, there have been a number of studies in health worker motivation 
largely outside the economics literature. Mathauer and Imhoff (2006) report a 
study using in-depth interviews with nurses and doctors in Benin and Kenya aim-
ing to assess the role of nonfinancial incentives in influencing motivation. Health 
workers in both countries recognized that they were frequently demotivated and 
frustrated, and identified the roots of these problems as an inability to meet their 
professional goals given features of their environment that make that difficult. 
Alongside predictable constraints such as inadequate supplies and equipment 
was the poor implementation of human resources management tools, and fea-
tures of organizational culture that penalized individuals for deviating from 
norms of working practice. These features are hard to assimilate in a health labor 
market analysis. They imply that noneconomic variables may dominate in deter-
mining the quality of labor supply.
In a mixed-methods study involving interviews, observation, and a survey, 
Chandler et al. (2009) also recognized a range of noneconomic variables playing 
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important roles in the determination of motivational levels among nonphysician 
clinicians in two regions of Tanzania, but found that salary considered adequate, 
and commensurate with social status expectations, was a clear prerequisite for 
motivation, suggesting in contrast that a labor market framework may be of 
some use.
Some studies have sought to measure productivity or performance of 
health staff. Vujicic, Ohiri, and Sparkes (2009), for example, explore the 
applicability of a productivity measurement tool in Ghana. They find a 
skewed distribution across districts, indicating that the majority of districts 
are significantly less productive than is apparently feasible. However, their 
notion of a “productivity frontier,” which is only implicit in these authors’ 
argument, does not recognize variable productivity potential at district level; 
the analysis proves to be highly sensitive to the weighting formula applied to 
different outputs; and there appear to be data quality issues. The authors 
conclude that further work is needed to develop a more sophisticated weight-
ing scheme.
Underperformance relative to ideals or norms might be explained by capacity 
deficits or by motivational deficits. Leonard and Masatu (2010) explore the dis-
tinction by exploiting what they call the Hawthorne effect, in interpretation, the 
difference between the performance of staff when they know they are observed 
and when they do not, to distinguish between the two. For doctors operating in 
the Arusha region of Tanzania, they find a variable degree of difference between 
the two sets of observations (and a regression to prior performance levels over 
time indicating that the effect of observation diminishes over time), which is 
smaller for nonpublic facilities than public facilities and smaller in facilities with 
greater decentralization of decision making on, for example, hiring and firing and 
setting salary levels.
These findings are consistent with those of Das and Hammer (2004, 2005) 
who use theoretical knowledge tested by vignettes as their basis, and find signifi-
cant performance problems in Delhi, India, correlated with provider type and 
location with facilities in richer areas and the private sector containing higher 
performing doctors. These findings contrast with those of Das and Sohnesen 
(2007) in Paraguay, however, where Ministry of Health facilities performed bet-
ter in relation to a doctor effort index than facilities associated with Paraguay’s 
social security system.
note
 1. There is a large literature in labor economics concerning the impact of trade unions 
on wages and employment (Ehrenberg and Schwarz 1986; Lewis 1986).
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Analytical Approaches
Two main types of labor market analysis use an explicit economics framework: 
descriptive and causal analysis.
Descriptive labor market analysis helps establish the nature and extent of labor 
market disequilibrium, which in turn help inform the identification of key issues, 
research questions, and further analysis and policies to improve the efficient operation 
of the labor market. It might provide data about demand, compensation, market 
structure, supply, interaction of demand and supply, trends, and distribution. There 
are few descriptive studies of the international labor market that shapes health profes-
sional migration trends, but there are more studies at the national level.
Causal labor market analysis attempts to identify the effects of changes in labor 
market supply and demand conditions or regulation on the behavior of both employ-
ers and workers, and on the value of these changes to society. Understanding the range 
of factors that can influence labor market behaviors is essential in developing policies 
to reduce labor market disequilibrium to improve societal outcomes. Causality can be 
established using experimental approaches (e.g. randomized control trials), quasi-
experimental approaches (e.g. difference-in- difference analysis), and non-experimental 
approaches (e.g. instrumental variable analysis).
Relevant descriptive datasets include the number of health workers of different 
types, age, gender, hours worked, specialty, and geographic location. Data to examine 
the causal effects of policy change include these descriptive data, but often contain 
more variables (and are longitudinal) to enable the researcher to control for as many 
factors influencing behavior as possible.
The previous discussion of issues and empirical evidence involved a wide range 
of analytical approaches used by labor economists that this report cannot discuss 
in full. However, the application of labor and health economics to the analysis of 
health care labor markets requires an understanding of the broad types of empiri-
cal methods used, and of the types of data that are essential in supporting these 
analyses. The aim of this section is therefore to broadly summarize the nature 
and types of analytical approaches that can be used and types of data that are 
required, and so is more relevant to those wishing to pursue such analyses.
c h a p t e r  4
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Ideally, it is appealing to develop a theoretical model and use this to  generate 
predictions and hypotheses that can be tested using data and various empirical 
approaches. Theoretical models examine the conceptual  relationships between 
different “actors” in the market, and model the effect of changes in incentives and 
other policy drivers on behavior. They often understand  situations by simplifying 
them using a range of assumptions about what is in the utility functions of actors 
(e.g. consumption, leisure, and patient health status), what time and money con-
straints they face when maximizing their utility, and how market relationships 
work. Theory models can be used to make specific predictions that are tested 
using empirical data that match the variables examined in the theoretical 
 models—these are known as structural models.
The most widely used is the economic theory of labor supply that examines 
the effect of changes in wages on hours worked (Blundell and Macurdy 1999). 
Theoretical models may also be developed to analyze a specific  problem—we 
have already discussed a theoretical model of dual practice (González and 
Macho-Stadler 2013). Testing these models is often difficult as empirical data 
often do not match what is in the theory model, and so “reduced form” empirical 
approaches are used. More often, theoretical  models provide a broad framework 
that identifies the key variables, relationships, and assumptions that should be 
examined in empirical work. In reduced form empirical models, empirical results 
are more difficult to interpret though much can still be learned through the use 
of micro- econometric techniques that help to move from measuring associations 
to identifying causality.
In this section, we focus largely on empirical rather than theoretical and struc-
tural approaches. Nevertheless, it is important to be able to use economic 
 thinking and frameworks discussed in previous sections to help guide the design 
of empirical work and data collection.
As there are a wide range of analytical approaches that depend on the prob-
lem and research question at hand (the Handbook of Labor Economics, for 
example, now runs to four volumes), this section summarizes the broad 
approaches used in labor market analysis. For those who wish to explore these 
approaches in more detail, see Angrist and Krueger (1999); Blundell and 
Macurdy (1999); DiNardo and Lee (2011); List and Rasul (2011); and Moffitt 
(1999).
The type of empirical labor market analysis and data collected should be 
driven by the policy issues and research questions being addressed. There are two 
main types of labor market analysis that use an explicit economics framework 
(Angrist and Krueger 1999): descriptive and causal.
Descriptive labor market analysis: the nature and extent of 
Disequilibrium
Descriptive labor market analysis uses a range of data sources to establish the 
current state of the labor market or labor market problem: it can therefore be 
general with the aim of identifying trends and issues, or can focus on an already 
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known issue and begin to describe its key features and characteristics. Research 
questions and hypotheses are usually generated through such an analysis of the 
labor market.
Descriptive analysis helps establish the nature and extent of labor market 
disequilibrium, which in turn helps in identifying key issues, research 
 questions, further analysis, and, ultimately, policies to improve the efficient 
operation of the labor market. Disequilibrium, as we have seen, may exist 
because of the way the health system has been structured and funded, the 
types (or lack) of institutions and regulations that govern health worker 
labor markets, and any changes in demand and supply conditions that have 
altered market forces and the behavior of employers and health workers. 
These include more general changes in the economy and in government 
spending that influence the demand for health workers, and so it is often 
important to look beyond the health care sector. Analyses may consist of 
some simple cross-tabulations and associations, e.g. comparing wages (and 
other characteristics) in the public and private sectors, or between urban and 
rural areas, and how the wage gap is changing over time, and can provide 
some testable hypotheses that can be explored further with econometric 
analysis.
It is often hard to identify disequilibrium in the literature, and so a range of 
data on trends in workforce supply and demand or need is used. Judgments 
are then frequently made about the existence of a shortage or surplus and how 
these may develop into the future. In simple terms, one needs to observe trends 
and changes in wages rates (prices) and employment (quantities) to be able to 
identify shortage or surplus.
Though many health workforce planning exercises attempt to project demand 
and supply into the future, these are largely devoid of economic thinking and 
so ignore important economic information, such as budget constraints and 
changes in wages or prices and specific measures of shortage, such as vacancies 
and waiting times (Scott et al. 2011). The importance of examining variations or 
changes in wages can reveal much about the state of the labor market, yet it is 
surprising that very little is known or collected about wages in most national 
health workforce data collections. This should be a central item for data collec-
tion in any labor market analysis.
Ideally, a descriptive analysis of the whole labor market would seek to cover 
the range of issues already discussed in the previous sections and summarized in 
the questions below:
•	 Demand. What are recent trends in population or regional need for health care? 
How is the health system funded, and how is the health workforce funded and 
paid for? What are the issues surrounding potential changes in skill mix?
•	 Wages, compensation, prices, waiting times, and vacancies. What are the key 
 indicators of shortage or surplus in the labor market, including differences 
and movements in wages or prices for services, vacancies, and employment? 
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Where wages are inflexible, what are the trends in waiting times for specific 
health workers?
•	 Market structure. How many separate employers are there in the market, and 
are health workers organized into unions? What is the extent of competition 
for workers between employers?
•	 Supply. What are the trends in the numbers, characteristics, and distribution of 
health workers? This is often the main and only information available to gov-
ernments where health workers are licensed or accredited, but without other 
data, it is impossible to assess the nature or extent of labor market disequilibri-
ums. Examination of changes in the age and gender composition of health 
workers may, though, be revealing in terms of identifying shortages, for exam-
ple, where the workforce is getting older on average, suggesting lower numbers 
of entrants into the workforce. Other assumptions of the perfectly competitive 
model are relevant to describe here, such as the extent to which entry into the 
labor market is restricted through training, accreditation, and licensing.
•	 The interaction of demand and supply. Taking into account information on 
wages, prices, waiting times, and data on the number of health workers (price 
and quantity data), is the labor market in surplus or shortage? A shortage 
would be indicated by rising wages, vacancies, and waiting times, combined 
with reductions in supply such as falling hours worked or falling numbers of 
health workers. A surplus would be indicated by falling wages, vacancies, and 
waiting times, and unemployment of health workers. Given problems of 
 market imperfections and market failure, wages may not be flexible and so not 
change very much over time. Then the data on waiting times and prices or 
vacancies may be more reliable indicators of labor market conditions. If wages 
are not changing over time in response to changes in demand and supply con-
ditions, this is evidence of market rigidities and imperfections that may need to 
be examined.
•	 Trends in the broader labor market. What is happening in the general labor 
 market, and are these trends influencing the labor market for health workers? 
A range of other occupations competes for health workers, and so examining 
broader labor markets trends will also inform what is occurring in health 
worker labor markets. For example, if wage rates in other occupations are fall-
ing relative to those for health workers, this increases the attractiveness of 
health care as an occupation.
•	 Distribution. How does each of the above vary across submarkets, including 
geographic markets, public or private markets, specialties, and acute care  versus 
community settings? Wage differentials and movements of workers between 
these markets may also be indicative of changes in demand and supply 
conditions.
Analytical Approaches 63
Analyzing Markets for Health Workers • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0224-9 
Below are some examples from low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) 
of studies that have attempted to provide a “whole of labor market” analysis by 
answering a range of the above questions. These studies have explicitly taken a 
labor market approach and have, to some extent, considered the interaction of 
demand and supply sides at national or international level. A much larger num-
ber of studies have provided situation analyses of human resources for health at 
national level in quite a wide range of countries. These latter studies provide 
descriptions relevant to an understanding of the whole health labor market, but 
often leave important gaps, such as information about salary and allowance levels 
or the extent of vacant posts, which, filled, would better allow for more compre-
hensive labor market analysis.
For example, Clark, Stewart, and Clark (2006) and Pond and McPake (2006) 
used international labor market frameworks to analyze the issue of health profes-
sional migration. Clark, Stewart, and Clark (2006) identified growing shortages, 
particularly of registered nurses in the United States and Europe, as the underly-
ing force driving increased migration characterizing the decade up to 2005. While 
identifying factors such as aging and the growth of opportunities for women in 
alternative careers in both regions as underpinning the shortage, they failed to 
clarify why markets failed to clear, the explanation of which is likely to depend on 
the variable institutional arrangements for nursing (and other health professional) 
employment in different countries.
Under the heading of theories of globalization, Clark, Stewart, and Clark 
(2006) explored how health professional migration might represent the efficient 
operation of the global market in sourcing health labor formation inputs at least 
cost and in securing health professional labor at lower cost, and might in turn 
enable the labor forces of high income countries to compete in other markets. 
This assumes that market mechanisms operate and hence health care employers 
save on wages or other employment costs by expanding sources of labor supply 
to new geographic areas. The authors did not, however, provide data to support 
this theoretical argument.
Pond and McPake (2006) explored the political decisions that have shaped 
the demand side in the health labor markets of Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, showing that political 
processes have tended to be cyclical in expanding and contracting demand 
for health professionals’ labor. In the early to mid-1990s, expansion tenden-
cies coincided across several large OECD countries (France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, the United States), while in the preceding periods there 
had either been a tendency to constrain the growth of government-funded 
health professional training institutions in these countries or a tendency to 
diminish relative pay of some health professionals, resulting in reduced 
recruitment to training institutions. Importing health professionals was 
 proposed as a short-term mechanism to manage resulting market 
disequilibrium.
Among national studies that used a health labor market framework explicitly, 
Vujicic et al. (2011) considered the market for physicians in Vietnam. They find 
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that the higher returns to urban public health sector employment compared 
with rural public health sector employment are influenced by the potential prof-
itability of dual practice and the bonuses that can be earned from user-fee 
 revenue sharing, which are most pronounced in higher level hospitals. These 
factors negate the impact of higher basic salary levels in rural areas. Their other 
main finding is a very low level of labor mobility, suggesting limited force of the 
market on employment decisions of Vietnamese doctors and contrasting with 
these doctors’ stated employment objectives (to attain more urban, private, cura-
tive, and specialized posts) in an earlier phase of the same research project 
(Witter et al. 2011). The reasons why these doctors were not more mobile in 
pursuing their employment objectives are unclear.
Herbst et al. (2011) reviewed components of the health labor market for all 
types of health workers in Zambia using data largely related to 2005–08. The low 
stock of health workers in Zambia was explained by capacity constraints on 
health training institutions and out-migration that has been estimated well above 
the Sub-Saharan African average. Funded but unfilled posts suggest labor short-
age market disequilibrium in the terms of Fields and Andalon (2008), although 
there were also further “established” posts that were not funded. Acute 
 maldistribution of the health workforce was explained by unattractive market 
conditions in rural areas despite the introduction of a rural incentive scheme, and 
to a significant degree, unattractive nonfinancial market conditions were 
 estimated to contribute to these.
Herbst et al. (2011) linked high absenteeism to the nonmarket forces of inad-
equate management and accountability mechanisms, but also the market related 
forces involved in the competing incentives of dual practice. They identified 
problems of quality and quantity of labor supply, but did not undertake further 
analysis of the roles played by capacity and motivational issues. They identified 
limited fiscal space and national health expenditure as factors contributing to 
problems across the health labor market both directly (in the declining wage bill 
over time, which was attributed largely to shifts in donor funding from general 
budgetary support) and indirectly (in affecting conditions of employment, 
 particularly in rural areas that gave rise to unattractive nonfinancial market con-
ditions there).
Appiah-Denkyira et al. (2013) reviewed components of the health labor 
market for all types of health workers in Ghana, relative to Zambia. They find 
that Ghana’s health workforce is more plentiful, less badly distributed 
between urban and rural areas, and performing better on absenteeism 
and quality of care, although problems in all these areas exist. Informal charg-
ing seems to be limited. They argue that these outcomes stem from both labor 
market dynamics and the processes of the health professional education 
 system, although they do not extensively identify the roles played by labor 
market forces.
Feysia et al. (2012) provide a similarly structured review of the Ethiopian 
health labor market, explicitly identifying few specific market forces as influen-
tial. However, among those are the mechanisms operating in dual practice and 
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the greater potential earning level of private practice in urban areas, competition 
for health professionals from the private sector (with particularly large salary 
differentials for doctors), and motivational responses to perceptions of low sala-
ries and poor working conditions.
causal labor market analysis
Descriptive analysis alone cannot be used to inform specific policy design or 
examine the causal impact of policy change. Causal labor market analysis 
attempts to identify the causal effects of changes in labor market supply and 
demand conditions or regulation on the behavior of both employers and workers, 
and on the value of these changes to society. Understanding the range of factors 
that can influence labor market behavior is essential in developing policies to 
reduce labor market disequilibrium to improve societal outcomes. Behavior can 
be defined as labor market behavior (recruitment, retention, retirement, career 
choices, hours worked), labor productivity and health care outputs (e.g. number 
of services provided), or the value of changes in productivity to society (captured 
through wages where markets work, or in health care, measures of health status 
and quality of care). Theoretical models can help one understand the relationship 
between policy changes and behavior.
These types of empirical analyses may be conducted within a number of 
 contexts from a full cost-benefit analysis of the costs and welfare effects of a 
specific labor market policy intervention, to the estimation of effects of such 
policies on a single labor market outcome, such as wages, retention, or distribu-
tion. The latter is more common in health and labor economics. Both are referred 
to as “program evaluation” and can be conducted retrospectively (after the policy 
is introduced and data collected) or prospectively (the policy has not yet been 
introduced and primary data collection may be required).
In health care, the most common types of cost-benefit analysis are concerned 
with skill mix changes that are evaluated using randomized controlled trials 
(Laurant et al. 2004). Typically these are not cost-benefit analyses as strictly 
defined as they measure benefits in nonmonetary terms using cost-utility or cost-
effectiveness analysis, given the absence of prices that reflect consumers’ value of 
services provided in health care. These outcomes therefore include measures of 
quality of care and health outcomes of patients.
It is essential that information on both costs and benefits are used to decide 
on the value of different labor market policies. In health care, apart from the 
literature on skill mix change, there are very few studies that examine costs as 
well as benefits.
How Is Causality Established?
The central issue in causal labor market analysis is being able to move from 
examining an association between a policy intervention and an outcome— 
typically not useful for policy design—to measuring a causal effect such that we 
know with more certainty that changing X will lead to a change in Y.
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Ideally, we would like to observe changes in the outcome (Y) in the presence 
and absence of the labor market policy, then the difference in outcome between 
these two states of the world would reflect the effect of the labor market policy. 
This requires data on subjects i (individuals, organizations, or geographic areas) 
exposed to the policy intervention Ti (the treatment group) and subjects who are 
not Ci (the control group).
A causal effect is identified when the subjects in the treatment and control 
groups are identical with respect to all factors that might influence Yi. The effect 
of the policy on Y is “unbiased.” All factors that might influence the outcome 
are controlled for and so are identical, and the only difference between the 
treatment and control groups is the presence of the labor market policy. If not, 
there is the possibility that a key factor that is different between the treatment 
and control groups has influenced the outcome, rather than labor market policy. 
The  problem is that only some of the factors that influence Yi are observed in 
the data (X)—other factors influencing Yi (Z) might be unobserved to the 
researcher. Knowledge of the process through which subjects are assigned to the 
treatment and control groups is therefore crucial in identifying a causal effect. 
Were subjects assigned by chance (randomization) or by some other selection 
process that was or can be observed?
Identifying causal effects is often sought through different types of study 
design and the use of micro-econometric analysis. Different types of analysis use 
different methods to try and identify the counterfactual, i.e. what would have 
happened to Y in the absence of the labor market policy. The outcome may 
change for other reasons that need to be accounted for, which is often referred 
to as endogeneity, where the effect of the policy on Y is partly determined by 
other unobserved factors that influence both the policy and the outcome Y. In 
this case, we cannot be sure whether the policy or the unobserved factor 
 influenced Y.
Experimental Approaches
Experimental study designs such as randomized controlled trials, where ran-
domization helps ensure that subjects are identical in the treatment and control 
groups, are regarded as the “gold standard” of study design, and are a relatively 
recent development in labor economics, where they are referred to as field 
experiments (List and Rasul 2011). Though use of randomized trials in health 
care is much more common, their application in evaluating labor market poli-
cies is limited to skill mix change, partly because randomization may not be 
possible where labor market policy is changed for a whole country—thus a 
concurrent control group cannot be used and a counterfactual cannot be 
identified.
Quasi-experimental designs include difference-in-difference analysis where 
observations on subjects (i) in the treatment (T  ) and control (C) groups are 
made before (Yt–1) and after (Yt+1) the policy is introduced, often for a number 
of  periods so time trends can be captured (Angrist and Krueger 1999). One can 
then observe the difference in the outcome for the treatment group over time, 
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Y Yt
T
t
T
1 –1−+ , and the difference in the outcome for the control group (the counter-
factual) over time, Y Yt
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1 –1−+ . Under certain assumptions, the difference between 
these differences— Y Y Y Y( ) ( )t
T
t
T
t
C
t
C
1 –1 1 –1− − −+ + —is the effect of the policy interven-
tion on Y. This is implemented within an econometric framework that depends 
on the nature of the data at hand. Any differences in the observed characteristics 
of the control and treatment groups can be included as independent variables in 
the regression model.
Although randomization should be used wherever possible, there are often 
good reasons to use other study designs where randomized trials are not possible, 
do not replicate real-world implementation of a policy, are subject to bias in their 
design and selection of subjects, or are not generalizable to the population 
(Rothwell 2005).
Most empirical approaches in labor economics use revealed preference data 
on actual behavior change. Labor economists often mistrust data on stated inten-
tions. However, in health economics and other areas where market failure is 
pervasive (e.g. environmental economics) and there are simply no data on 
revealed preferences, stated preference methods are increasingly used in health 
workforce surveys. In particular, discrete choice experiments (DCEs) are based 
in random utility theory and can provide important data on preferences on 
which to base policy. An advantage of stated preference methods is that choices 
are presented exogenously to respondents using the experimental design, and so 
the difficulties of identifying causal effects of job characteristics are largely 
avoided. We therefore classify DCEs in the general class of experimental 
 methods, but they are more similar to laboratory experiments than field 
experiments.
Non-Experimental Approaches
More often than not, experimental designs are infeasible and so micro- 
econometric methods are used to attempt to control for unobservable factors 
that influence Y, in addition to the labor market policy. The aim of using a 
control group that has not been exposed to the intervention (the counterfac-
tual) is still the key feature of the study design. The problem in non- 
experimental methods is that the control group is not identical to the 
treatment group in all respects. Though one might observe a difference in Y 
if a policy changes, this may in fact be due to other factors that determine Y 
and are correlated with X. For example, in a labor supply model that attempts 
to examine the effect of a change in wages on hours worked (Y), another vari-
able that influences both wages and hours worked is gender. Women earn less 
than men and work fewer hours. The size of the association between wages 
and hours (i.e. the wage elasticity) also includes, and is confounded by, the 
effect of gender on hours worked. The wage elasticity is therefore biased. 
Factors that influence Y apart from labor market policy and are observed in 
the data (X) can simply be included as independent variables in the regression 
model, reducing the bias of the effect of the policy change. Controlling for 
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confounding variables is an essential element of regression analysis (Angrist 
and Krueger 1999).
The next source of bias is that there may also be factors (Z) that influence 
Y and X but are not observed in the data. This is an important problem in 
micro-econometrics that has been handled in two main ways. The mechanism 
that assigns a subject to the labor market program is not observed or 
measured.
The first way is where Z does not change over time—it is time invariant. 
In the labor supply model, one might assume that unobserved ability and 
skills of workers or the characteristics of firms they work at influence both 
wages and hours worked but are fixed over at least short periods. The use 
of panel data where Y, X, and Z of workers are observed over multiple 
time points provides an important opportunity to control for variables that 
are time invariant. Each observation is no longer independent of the next, a 
key assumption of linear regression analysis. A single individual will have 
 multiple observations of Y and X in the data, one observation for each 
period.
Panel data econometrics techniques account for Z using two main meth-
ods. The first method (random-effects panel data models) accounts for the 
correlations of Z and other unobserved factors influencing Y within the same 
individual over time or of individuals within the same firm. The second 
method  (fixed-effects panel data models) exploits the fact that if one were to 
take first differences of Y and X (e.g. Yit–Yit−1) and so use changes over time 
as variables in the regression model, then the difference in any value of Z that 
does not change over time is zero, and so does not influence the change in Y. 
The X that we observe (e.g. gender) and the Z that we do not observe (e.g. 
ability and skills) do not need to be included in the model. Fixed-effects 
methods also have the advantage of allowing for correlations between the 
unobservable fixed effects and all other independent variables in the 
 regression model.
Panel data econometrics and its many variants are key tools in micro- 
econometrics to estimate close to causal effects. Panel data techniques can also 
be used alongside difference-in-difference study designs that rely on panel data 
with multiple measurements at different points in time.
The collection of panel/longitudinal data is very important. Not only can it 
be used to apply panel data econometrics, but panel data can be used to account 
for the timing of the introduction of a labor market policy to avoid a common 
problem with cross-sectional data collected at a single point in time: reverse 
causality. In a labor supply model, wages influence hours worked, but hours 
worked also influence wages. In a cross-section of data, it is not possible to 
determine the direction of causality. However, this is essential to estimate causal 
effects where the labor market policy is introduced first (e.g. an increase in 
wages), which consequently influences behavior (increased hours worked). 
With panel data one can account for reverse causality by using the values of 
variables measured at different points in time, such that wage change is 
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measured now when it occurs, and hours worked are measured at future time 
points. Using the lagged value of wages rather than the current value can 
account for reverse causality.
The second main way to reduce bias caused by unobserved Z is instrumental 
variable (IV) estimation. This technique explicitly recognizes that the presence 
of the labor market policy is influenced by a specific set of factors that are dif-
ferent from the factors that influence the outcome Y. This may be when the 
labor market policy is introduced but where take-up of the policy is voluntary 
and subject to some type of selection process. A pay-for-performance program 
may be voluntary, union membership is voluntary, as might a move to a rural 
area that now attracts financial incentives. Even where a hospital introduces 
such a program for all its workers, workers can choose to leave or join this hos-
pital after the policy is introduced, meaning that the measured effect of the 
program on performance may not be due to the program itself, but a different 
mix of workers at the firm or some other factors that influence the choice of 
hospital.
In the case of IV, we not only know that Z is correlated with Y and X, but 
we wish to model this relationship explicitly, often in a separate regression 
model. Furthermore, we need to choose an independent variable (the IV) that 
influences the adoption of the policy (e.g. that influences workers choosing 
to participate) and so causes variation in the adoption of the policy, but that 
is not correlated with unobserved factors that influence the outcome Y. The 
IV needs to be  exogenous to Y and not be correlated with it. Ideally, one 
needs to observe  something else that influences the decisions of health work-
ers to join the program or make use of the labor market policy that has noth-
ing to do with the labor market policy or its outcomes. This therefore 
attempts to identify a causal effect of the policy on Y, by separating out the 
part of the variation in Y that is due to the effect of the exogenous variation 
driven by the IV. Finding a variable that  influences selection into the program 
but that does not influence the outcome of the program is often problematic, 
and a large literature discusses how this can be done (Angrist and Krueger 
1999).
Other types of analysis include regression discontinuity designs and matching 
methods. Regression discontinuity designs exploit abrupt changes in Y over time, 
which control for otherwise smooth trends. The allocation of subjects to the 
treatment or control group is determined by a threshold and the movement of 
subjects across the threshold (DiNardo and Lee 2011). This may include eligibil-
ity for a specific payment being determined by a specific level of measured 
 performance or other measurable criteria. Identification of causal effects comes 
from the fact that subjects just below the threshold will be very similar to those 
just above the threshold—and that their position just above or below the thresh-
old is effectively random. This relies on good knowledge of the process used to 
determine the threshold.
Matching methods is another set of methods used to construct a control group 
that closely matches the characteristics of the treatment group. It provides a 
70 Analytical Approaches
Analyzing Markets for Health Workers • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0224-9
more comparable control group than regression methods, though it relies only on 
the characteristics of the subjects that can be observed.
Many of the above methods can also be combined in a single analysis where 
the data allow. For example, fixed effects, reverse causality, and IVs can be com-
bined in a dynamic panel data model. This also recognizes that Y (e.g. hours 
worked) this year is influenced by Y in previous years and so also examines per-
sistence while using fixed effects (first differences) and lags of independent 
 variables as instruments (Bond 2002).
Data requirements
Ideally, data are collected that are relevant to the research question being 
addressed. This approach is possible with specially designed surveys and data 
collection exercises, but where it is not, one needs to rely on existing adminis-
trative and survey data. A variety of sources contain data on the health work-
force, including personnel records of employers, registration and accreditation 
databases, tax records, or health insurance records. Labor force surveys usually 
 contain richer information on worker characteristics than administrative 
sources.
The previous section highlighted the importance for causal labor market 
analysis of panel data, where measurements on individuals are linked over time 
in panel or cohort studies. With only a cross-section, it is much harder to identify 
causal effects.
As said, data on wages and earnings of health workers are essential for any 
kind of economic labor market analysis. Changes and movements in wages and 
earnings, combined with other information, tell us much about how market 
forces are operating and the behavior of workers. The centrality of their role in 
labor markets, even in those that do not work very well, means that most types 
of analysis in labor economics involve the collection and analysis of data on wages 
or earnings of health professionals, and examining their differentials between 
occupations, specialties, age groups, genders, and geographic areas (including 
countries) reveals much about how labor markets are working. Unfortunately, 
many health care systems have failed to translate this fundamental requirement 
for labor market analysis into data collection items in surveys of the health work-
force or in administrative data collections.
Descriptive data are important in describing what is currently happening, or 
what has happened in the past. As a minimum, these datasets often include the 
number of health workers of different types: age, gender, hours worked, 
 specialty, and geographic location. These data are usually obtained from 
 registration databases or personnel records. If data come from personnel 
records of health systems, they may also include information on wages and earn-
ings, which are essential for any type of basic labor market analysis. Cross-
tabulations of data (e.g. wages by specialty) can be used to begin examining 
associations between key variables, which can in turn be used to generate and 
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test hypotheses as to why changes have occurred, or why the current labor mar-
ket is as it is.
Data that are used to examine the causal effects of policy change include the 
same descriptive data, but often differ in two aspects. First, they contain more 
variables to enable the researcher to control for as many factors influencing 
behavior as possible. These include data linked to health worker organizations 
and their characteristics, and information about their household (household 
income and the presence of children are predicted in labor models to have a large 
influence on hours worked), which are necessary to isolate the causal effect of 
policy, rather than just showing association. These data might include informa-
tion from surveys and primary data collection that obtain information about 
those family circumstances that are not usually available in administrative data 
sources.
Second, they can be longitudinal, with health workers followed up over time 
and appearing in the data every year. This requires a unique identifier in datasets 
that can be used to link individuals over time. Such panel data are essential in 
being able to control for unobserved factors that do not change over time, and in 
accounting for reverse causality.
Administrative datasets are usually comprehensive in coverage of the popula-
tion of health workers, and may have data on health workers organized in firms 
(e.g. hospitals and their characteristics) but often contain little data on health 
worker characteristics or their productivity or performance. Data on health 
workers may be linkable over time.
Surveys of the health workforce can enable the collection of much richer 
data on the characteristics of health workers, their jobs, their families, and the 
characteristics of where they live. One can collect “bespoke” data that 
directly address the research question being asked. However, a key issue with 
surveys is their external validity and generalizability, so it is important to 
use appropriate sampling methods and survey weights to assess 
representativeness.
The linkage of health workforce data (inputs) to data on outputs and out-
comes in health care (see figure 2.1) is difficult in many countries. Yet such link-
age is fundamental for examining the impact of different health workforce 
policies on efficiency and equity in health care. These datasets go beyond health 
workforce datasets. For example, a dataset of hospital activity and outputs should 
ideally link each episode of care to the health worker who provided that episode 
of care, and his or her characteristics. The design of administrative datasets that, 
within a hospital, link personnel records to hospital activity and outputs would 
provide a key link between health workers and the outcomes they produce, 
greatly facilitating research and analysis of the most efficient use of the health 
workforce.
An example of a dataset designed specifically to analyze medical labor mar-
kets using labor economics approaches is the Medicine in Australia: Balancing 
Employment and Life (MABEL) panel survey of doctors (box 4.1).
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Box 4.1 maBel panel survey of Doctors
The MABEL survey is an example of a panel survey that collects data from around 10,000  doctors 
(20% of all doctors in Australia) every year.a It is unique as it is the only panel survey in the world 
examining physicians that has been designed for examining causal effects through the use of 
panel data econometric analysis. The survey can also be used for descriptive analysis.
The detailed methods and design of the survey including copies of questionnaires are 
available on the website (www.mabel.org.au). The survey is very much focused on the supply 
side as it is a survey of the decisions and characteristics of doctors, and so contains little infor-
mation about need or demand. The survey included DCEs in Wave 1 (2008) and can be used to 
observe doctors’ actual job changes over time. MABEL is funded by the National Health and 
Medical Research Council, through the Centre for Research Excellence in Medical Workforce 
Dynamics. The survey is currently funded for nine annual waves through 2016.
There are three research themes that MABEL is used to address: workforce participation 
(e.g. labor supply models), career transitions (e.g. specialty choice and retirement, retention), 
and rural workforce supply and distribution. The research also looks at the role of financial 
incentives and other factors influencing labor market decisions and outcomes. In addition to 
collecting data on earnings, the survey collects a range of information on family circumstances 
including information about the doctor’s spouse and children, which can have important 
effects on hours worked and on choosing whether to work in a rural area (Figure B4.1.1 
 provides an overview of the type of data collected).
The dataset relies on a national source of data containing the contact details of all doctors 
in Australia that can be linked over time. This also enables the calculation of response weights 
that help ensure that the data are representative of the population of doctors in Australia. 
Research findings from MABEL can be found on the website.
Figure B4.1.1 types of Data collected by the maBel survey
a. There are, of course, other panel datasets on the health workforce in other countries, but these are administrative datasets 
rather than survey datasets, with few including information on earnings.
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Gaps and Future Research
Of 57 countries in Africa, only around one-third of them have featured in this 
review, suggesting major geographic gaps in research on health labor markets in 
crisis- affected countries. The main topical gap is the limited link between theory and 
empirical  evidence. Key aspects of the health labor market, such as labor demand 
and its determination, informal charges, and others remain unexplored. The litera-
ture using discrete choice experiments to understand health workers’ preferences for 
job attributes has grown considerably, but stated choices need to be validated to 
allow generalization of results.
The academic literature that studies the health workforce using economic 
 methods of analysis is small. The most numerous types of studies are probably 
studies of the labor supply of nurses that attempt to estimate wage elasticities 
(Antonazzo et al. 2003; Shields 2004). There is also a relatively large literature 
evaluating pay for performance. Most of these studies are from the United States 
or Europe. There is also a growing literature that uses discrete choice experi-
ments (DCEs) to examine the job choices of health workers, most of it for 
 low-income countries.
Gaps by topic
An absence of material on labor demand and how it is constituted and 
 determined is a marked topical gap in the review. Vujicic, Addai, and Bosomprah 
(2009) provide a good starting point, reviewing how the public sector wage bill 
is determined. Public sector wage bills combine with other sources of effective 
demand including elements of the Ministry of Health’s funds that support health 
worker pay and employment (such as allowances and performance related 
bonuses) and private sector demand and expenditure on public and private 
 services. These are needed before the demand side of health labor markets can 
be fully described, much less analyzed. The distribution of demand appears to be 
a major factor in shaping labor supply responses, and it is only in understanding 
the distribution across both public and private sectors that this can be clearly 
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seen, as evidenced by a range of studies that show that the opportunities for dual 
practice in urban areas shapes the supply response despite public sector remu-
neration favoring rural areas in some cases.
Qin, Li, and Hsieh (2013) was the only study to estimate a labor supply 
model. They demonstrate the difficulties of estimation of the elasticity of labor 
supply without reliable and large-scale data sets but suggest that census data in 
countries in which particular questions are included (concerning field of 
employment, professional qualifications, salary/wage, and number of hours 
worked) might enable similar analyses in other countries where there is signifi-
cant salary or wage rate variation across employees in different sectors or 
regions.
The one cross-country based analysis of the elasticity of retention (or the 
responsiveness of out-migration to pay differences between countries) failed to 
find a strong relationship (Vujicic et al. 2004). This might be because health 
worker categories were not sufficiently disaggregated. It could also be because 
wage differentials were measured in absolute terms, whereas it could be that 
health workers are most responsive to relative rates of remuneration and may 
have reservation wages defined by local social status associations. Alternatively, it 
could be because it is necessary to measure other “push” factors as they apply 
differentially across countries suffering out-migration and found by a number of 
studies to be equally important to remuneration level (for example, Mangham 
and Hanson 2008; Penn-Kekana et al. 2005). These alternative explanations 
 provide a potential agenda for future research.
There is now a quite considerable body of studies using DCEs to under-
stand health professionals’ valuations of different job attributes and these 
appear to provide valuable information for policy makers. But the variability 
of responses suggests that generalizable conclusions will require more 
research, although the studies that have analyzed the correlates of utility 
 measures are a good start.
Given the variability, there is value in adding studies by country and cadre 
for local policy to be formulated, but these studies are complex and there is 
limited capacity at country level to undertake such studies appropriately. 
Before undertaking a wholesale and expensive effort to repeat DCEs for 
further cadres and geographic settings, further research should be consid-
ered, first to establish whether the responses to hypothetical questions can 
reliably predict behavior, and second to explore whether there is a simpler 
way of establishing the most important job attributes in different settings. 
Establishing correlations between DCE results and simpler survey results 
could enable a wider range of studies to be undertaken using simpler surveys, 
at lower cost.
The dual practice literature was critiqued as providing limited linkage between 
theory and empirical evidence, with very little of the latter. There is therefore 
considerable scope for empirical work that will test existing theories and generate 
new propositions about the relationships between key variables involved in dual 
practice such as the relative profitability of public and private sector work, the 
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dependency of private income streams on public sector job holding, and the 
undertaking of private practice within and outside public service facilities.
The significance of the findings of highly variable health worker effort associ-
ated with institutional characteristics (even if variably so) is that they provide 
support for the operation of a significant role of the health labor market in shap-
ing motivation, effort, and performance. If, as appears to be the case in Delhi and 
in Arusha (Das and Hammer 2004, 2005; Leonard and Masatu 2010), nonpublic 
facilities or facilities that have greater control over price and quantity (hiring and 
firing, salary setting) better elicit greater effort, this might be interpreted as hav-
ing implications for the role that stronger incentives can play in determining 
quality of labor supply as well as quantity. Evidence in Das and Sohnesen (2007) 
tempers the conclusion that might otherwise emerge that the private sector is 
always better able to manage market forces toward greater effort, suggesting 
perhaps that as health systems develop, public institutions can better manage 
outcomes.
The issue is not about whether there are public or private providers, but the 
incentives that each contains for effort and productivity and efficiency. Further 
research focusing on the processes shaping effort levels could clarify not only 
how this works in the private sector for richer patients in contexts such as 
Delhi, but how it can work to protect the interests of poorer patients who will 
not be able to access such facilities in the public sector in contexts such as 
Paraguay.
Data on salaries and allowances in the public sector and on remuneration in 
general in the private sector were demonstrated by McCoy et al. (2008) to be 
incomplete and barely capable of enabling even simple analyses of trends in 
absolute and relative levels, and in pay structures. As pay is the critical  variable 
in any labor market analysis, advances in the understanding of labor markets in 
low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) will not be possible without signifi-
cant improvements in data availability on the critical price variable.
Given the complexity introduced by the important contribution made by 
allowances, and the distribution of these among different health workers, a data 
collection system that can provide an adequate understanding of public sector 
pay will also need to be quite complex. Tracking private sector salaries and self-
employed earnings and earning potential is even more challenging, but examples 
of large-scale earnings and salary tracking exercises are available in other indus-
tries1 and in this, health may not be significantly more complex than other sec-
tors. It would probably not be feasible, however, to identify the full return to 
public health sector employment in an internationally comparable way, taking 
account of supplementary earnings that are derived or related to employment in 
a public role.
Further exploration of the existence of informal charges in private institu-
tions as well as public institutions in a wider range of geographic settings 
would enhance understanding of the return to private sector employment, and 
whether it too is underestimated by salary data. Further work on informal 
charges might clarify the labor market conditions that promote and restrict 
78 Gaps and Future Research
Analyzing Markets for Health Workers • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0224-9
informal charging, especially if Barr, Lindelow, and Serneels’s (2009) conclusion 
that wage rates do not provide strong explanations can be verified in data from 
real labor markets.
On the basis of the argument of Pond and McPake (2006), health professional 
migration would be predicted to rise and fall with the political cycles of larger 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, 
whereas the argument of Clark, Stewart, and Clark (2006) predicts the migration 
trend would only abate as training institution cost differentials and salary differ-
entials between rich and poor countries diminished. This provides a potential 
agenda for research clarifying the relationships between overall migration levels, 
patterns among source and destination countries, and labor formation costs and 
local market conditions in both source and destination countries.
Geographic Gaps
Of 57 countries in Africa—36 deemed to be in human resource crisis (WHO 
2006)—only 17 feature in the References, with sole pieces of evidence or studies 
available for 7 of these 17 and only 2 pieces of evidence or studies for a further 6. 
This suggests major geographic gaps in research on health labor markets in crisis-
affected countries and suggests a need for a greatly extended research effort (also, 
see figure 1.1).
It is also of note that among the countries in which no or very limited research 
has been identified are the most fragile and conflict-affected states. No studies 
were found, for example, in Angola, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Sudan, or Somalia, and only one in Liberia—perhaps the most conflict-
affected set of countries in the continent. If human resource scenarios are distinct 
in such settings, this presents a significant gap in our understanding of labor 
markets.
the Way Forward
This document has provided an overview of the application of economics to 
health worker labor markets. This framework needs to be applied much more 
consistently and systematically to understand how health care labor markets 
work, the extent and impact of market failure and market imperfections, and the 
types of analysis and data required to undertake economic analysis of health 
human resources.
One potential reason why economics has not been applied is the lack of data, 
especially on earnings. Improved datasets are an essential starting point that will 
help to urgently move beyond counting the health workforce and some of its 
basic characteristics, to understanding the determinants and solutions to labor 
market disequilibrium using high-quality descriptive and causal evidence. 
Administrative and survey datasets need to be designed so they can be matched 
to each other, matched over time, and also matched to data on health care utili-
zation and health system performance and outcomes. A final way forward is to 
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help train and attract more labor and health economists to undertake this vital 
research. Building capacity in health workforce research is fundamental in taking 
this agenda forward.
note
 1. For example, the International Labour Organization’s Key Indicators of the Labour 
Market database contains average monthly wages in the total economy for 99 coun-
tries, and average compensation costs for the employment of workers in the manufac-
turing sector for 34 countries. http://kilm.ilo.org/2011 / download/kilm15EN.pdf 
(accessed January 1, 2013).
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Studying health labor markets more closely could help resolve globally widespread human resources for 
health problems. The lack of labor market analysis of these problems provides some explanation for their 
persistence. Policy makers in countries promulgating or refining strategies for achieving universal health 
coverage will find it important to understand how key elements in their health labor market are likely to 
interact and how these interactions could help—or hinder—progress toward universal health coverage. These 
interactions are complex and multidimensional, and Analyzing Markets for Health Workers: Insights from Labor 
and Health Economics highlights areas where forces in the health labor market matter most.
This book provides an overview of the key issues policy makers will encounter when attempting to apply 
economics to the analysis of health workers’ labor markets. Though much has been written and planned about 
human resources for health, a major weakness with most of this analysis is that it does not use an economic 
perspective. The use of an explicit economic framework moves the focus away from simplistic but costly policy 
responses (such as training more doctors and nurses) toward understanding more carefully the role of 
incentives, productivity, and the distribution of health workforce. The health workforce is only one part of 
the health system, and a focus of analysis on only the health workforce will be insufficient to determine the 
optimal number of health workers. Due to well-recognized market failures in health care, market forces cannot 
be relied upon to solve well-known health workforce challenges, such as shortages, maldistribution, and 
performance.
Of interest to policy makers, researchers, and practitioners, Analyzing Markets for Health Workers: Insights from 
Labor and Health Economics is part of a multiyear World Bank Group program on human resources for health 
policies. The program’s ultimate objective is to strengthen knowledge and capacity to collect evidence, 
analyze, and evaluate the effectiveness of human resources for health interventions in the context of a 
country’s health system strengthening strategy and universal health coverage goals. It specifically addresses 
the theoretical and empirical evidence on health labor markets and proposes an agenda to address 
knowledge gaps and to build capacity for applying health labor market analysis in the context of low- and 
middle-income countries.
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